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INTRODUCTION
Meeting together in the hundreds and the thousands, large groups of young people
have congregated to engage in collective trance dances, or raves, often fueled by
the ingestion of a synthetic psychoactive substance, known as Ecstasy. Arousing
apprehension among parents and civic authorities, perplexed by this changing
pattern of behavior among youth, the phenomenon of ecstasy culture has riveted
societal concern on the potential dangers of its increasingly notorious chemical
sacrament [H]owever, full understanding of both its medical consequences
and cultural impact have remained elusive. Even within the current social context
of harsh Drug War era legal penalties, Ecstasy use has climbed sharply among
young people. A vast and unanticipated social experiment has occurred with
millions of adolescents and young adults worldwide consuming a drug that has
eluded definitive understanding and over which societal and medical
controversies persist. Given the magnitude ofpublic health and cultural
implications, an open and comprehensive review ofthe existing state of
knowledge, from diverse perspectives, needs to be pursued. [46 p.550]
The above quote, from "Deconstructing Ecstasy: The Politics ofMDMA Research"
by Charles Grob, summarizes some ofthe current issues surrounding the recreational
drug Ecstasy, a drug that has become a major focus of controversy involving federally
funded drug research and federal drug policy and is the subject of enormous media
attemion. The Ecstasy controversy provides a way to examine U.S. drug policy in
general and answer some important questions: How did we get to our currem situation in
the War on Drugs? Are our federal tax dollars being spem in the best imerest of our
society in terms ofthe well being ofour citizens? What are the altematives for
addressing drug use, an issue that has faced all societies throughout history?
The first section ofthis essay will look at Ecstasy: What is it, what are its acute and
chronic effects, and what is the scientific and political controversy about? The second
section will trace the history ofU.S. drug policy from it origins in the early part ofthe
twemieth cemury to the latest federal drug legislation, the RAVE Act, signed into law on
April 30, 2003. The third section will look at currem U.S. drug policy, its intended and
unimended consequences, and the issue ofdrug policy reform, specifically harm
reduction as an option for revision ofthe present U.S. prohibitionist policy.
SECTION I: ECSTASY
The History of MDMA/Ecstasy
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), commonly known as Ecstasy, is a drug
that has gained enormous popularity in recent years as a recreational drug in the United
States and across the globe. MDMA is the chemical name ofthe drug; Ecstasy is one of
its street names. The two are used interchangeably although the street form of the drug
often contains adulterants and thus may not be pure MDMA. In this essay, the drug will
be referred to as MDMA/Ecstasy except in the context of scientific research where
pharmaceutical grade MDMA is used.
MDMA/Ecstasy is related to many chemicals found in nature but requires alteration
to form the end product, and therefore it is a semi-synthetic drug.J50 p.8] Myristica
Fragrans is a tree that is the source of nutmeg and mace as well as safrole oil, which is the
precursor ofMDMA/Ecstasy; the sassafras root is a more potent source of safrole.[50
p.8] MDMA/Ecstasy is chemically related to the amphetamine group of drugs, which
includes methamphetamine (the street drug speed, crystal, or meth) and 3,4-
methamphetamine (MDA).[50 p.8] It belongs to the group of drugs known as
phenethylamines, which also includes mescaline.[50 p.8] MDMA/Ecstasy is not a
hallucinogen in the same sense as classic hallucinogens such as mescaline and LSD.[50
p.8; 113 p. 1491 ] MDMA/Ecstasy causes a subtle, controllable experience with
intensification of feelings and mild perceptual enhancement at the dosage used
recreationally.[50 p.23,25] MDMA/Ecstasy leaves reality testing intact.[50 p.23]
Adulterants found in the street, forms of MDMA/Ecstasy are believed responsible for the
frank hallucinogenic properties of some MDMA/Ecstasy.[50 p.163] Psychoactive effects
ofMDMA/Ecstasy are differem than any other drug.[50 p.8] It is not sedating like
alcohol and the anxiolytic drugs, such as the benzodiazepine class.[50 p.8] It does not
cause agitation or paranoia like cocaine and the other amphetamines.[50 p.8] "The
effects resemble an immediately acting anti-depressam.., but the euphoria and calm are
more profound."[50 p.8] It is felt that MDMA/Ecstasy deserves its own classification:
"Empathogen" (to create an empathetic state) or "Emactogen" (to create a touching
within) have been suggested.[50 p.8]
MDMA/Ecstasy has received a great deal ofattemion since the early 1980s but its
history extends back one hundred years.[50 p.11 ] Merck, the German pharmaceutical
company, first symhesized MDMA as an intermediate in the developmem ofanother
drug, Hydrastatin, a medication to stop bleeding.[50 p.11] In 1912 Merck filed a patem
application for Hydrastatin and MDMA was included in the application as an
intermediate chemical.[50 p.11] Between 1912 and 1953 essemially nothing was done
with MDMA.[50 p. 11 ] In 1953, at the University ofMichigan, the U.S. Army tested
MDMA along with various other psychotropic chemicals for potemial use in Cold War
espionage.[46 p.551; 50 p.11] The studies were conducted on animals and MDMA was
never used in humans for this purpose.[46 p.551; 50 p. 11 ]
In 1976 chemist Sasha Shulgin synthesized MDMA and with another chemist, Dave
Nichols, published the first human study ofMDMA. They described its effect as "an
easily comrolled altered state ofconsciousness with emotional and sensual
overtones."[50 p. 12] They introduced MDMA/Ecstasy as an adjunct in psychotherapy in
California. [50 p. 12] In the late sevemies and early eighties MDMA was used covertly as
an aid to psychotherapy.[50 p.13] Around this same time the recreational use of
MDMA/Ecstasy began.[50 p.13] Allegedly, a street dealer chose Ecstasy as the name for
the drug, for marketing reasons; "Ecstasy" would sell better than "Empathy."[50 p.13] In
the early 1980s a group in Texas produced and distributed MDMA/Ecstasy for
recreational use under the name "Sassafras" because the oil of safrole is the precursor.[50
p.13] The recreational use ofMDMA/Ecstasy came to the attention ofTexas Senator
Lloyd Bentson, who urged the Drug Enforcement Administration to make
MDMA/Ecstasy illegal.[50 p. 13] Senator Bentson’s efforts marked the beginning ofthe
controversial scheduling ofMDMA/Ecstasy as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA).[50 p.14] The CSA is in the United States Code, Title 21, Chapter
13, Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, Section 812, Schedules of Controlled
Substances, which was enacted as part ofthe Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevemion and
Control Act of 1970.[23]
The Scheduling Controversy
Scheduling ofdrugs is a process where all substances that are regulated under federal
law are placed in categories, known as schedules. There are five schedules, I through V,
based on potemial for abuse, currently accepted medical use, safety and potemial for
dependence.[132] Schedule I drugs are identified as having: "a high potemial for abuse,"
"no currently accepted medical use," and "lack ofaccepted safety" for use ofthe drug
under medical supervision.[132] Schedule I drugs are the most highly controlled drugs
and violations relating to these drugs carry the most severe criminal penalties.
The actual scheduling ofdrugs is delegated by the U.S. Attorney General to the
Administrator ofthe Drug Enforcemem Administration (DEA).[60 p.2143] Requests to
add, delete or change the schedule ofa drug may be initiated by the DEA, the Department
ofHealth and Human Services (HHS), or by petition from any interested party.[60
p.2143] The process begins with a DEA investigation ofthe drug and includes
completion by HHS ofa sciemific and medical evaluation followed by an HHS
recommendation regarding schedule placemem.[60 p.2143] HHS gathers information
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA).[60 p.2143-44] The recommendation by HHS is binding on the DEA only when
HHS recommends a substance not be comrolled.[60 p.2144] The Administrator ofthe
DEA reviews the data and recommendation from HHS and decides into which schedule a
drug should be placed.[60 p.2144] This decision is fmal and is subject to review only if a
court ofappeals f’mds extreme error in the scheduling process.[60 p.2144] Therefore,
once a drug is scheduled by the DEA, reversal is unlikely. Schedule classification ofa
drug depends on interpretation ofterminology in the CSA. Definitions ofthe terms
"potemial for abuse," "accepted medical use" and "level ofdependence" are not
comained in the CSA. However, the House Committee Report accompanying this Act
comains some guidelines on "potemial for abuse".[60 p.2145] The report states that a
substance has potemial for abuse if:
1) Individuals are taking the drug in amoums sufficiem to creme a hazard to their
health or to the safety of other individuals or ofthe community.
2) There is significant diversion ofthe drug from legitimate channels.
3) Individuals are taking the drug on their own initiative rather than on medical
advice.
4) The drug is related to a drug akeady listed as having a potemial for abuse.
Ofnote, there is no standard or recommendation for determining "high" potential for
abuse that places a drug in Schedule I.[60 p.2145]
On July 27, 1984, the DEA published in the Federal Register its intern to declare
MDMA/Ecstasy a Schedule I drug.[50 p.14] A group ofpsychiatrists, psychotherapists
and researchers requested hearings on MDMA/Ecstasy.[50 p. 14] The request was
granted and three hearings were scheduled.[50 p. 14] On May 31, 1985, DEA
Administrator John Lawn announced that he would not wait for completion ofthe
hearings because there was sufficiem data that MDMA/Ecstasy was being abused.[50
p. 14] A law passed in 1984 permits the DEA to schedule a drug for a period ofone year,
on an emergency basis, without hearings, out ofconcern for public safety.[50 p.14]
MDMA/Ecstasy is the only drug that has ever been scheduled by using this emergency
provision.[56]
Between February and July of 1985 the three hearings on MDMA/Ecstasy were
held.[50 p.14] Researchers, scientists, psychiatrists, psychotherapists and MDMA
patients testified at the hearings.[50 p. 14] Dr. Luis Seiden, from the University of
Chicago, spoke on behalf ofthe DEA.[50 p. 15] He presented animal data from studies
conducted at the University ofChicago by himself, graduate student George Ricaurte,
and other researchers, demonstrating neuron damage in rodents that were given injections
ofmethamphetamine (MDA), a related compound, but not MDMA.[50; 78] MDMA was
being implicated because injection use ofan analog, MDA, was shown to cause neuron
damage in animals.[50 p. 14-15; 78] George Ricaurte would become a key figure in
MDMA research as well as the comroversy surrounding the research.
On May 22, 1986, Judge Francis Young, who presided over the MDMA/Ecstasy
hearings, announced his decision.[50 p. 15] He felt there was accepted medical use for
MDMA/Ecstasy and recommended placemem in Schedule III.[50 p.15] This would
allow clinical use and research to continue. However, the definition of "accepted medical
use" became a comroversial issue. DEA administrator John Lawn interpreted "accepted
medical use" as having FDA approval, which MDMA/Ecstasy did not have.[50 p. 15]
Recall from above that the recommendation ofHHS is binding only if the
recommendation is that the substance not be scheduled as a controlled substance.(see p.6)
Administrator Lawn chose to ignore Judge Young’s recommendation for Schedule III
placement and proceeded to place MDMA/Ecstasy in Schedule 1.[7; 50 p.15]
Between December 1987 and March 1988, Dr. Lester Grinspoon, professor of
psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, appealed the DEA decision to place
MDMA/Ecstasy in Schedule I.[50 p.15] The First Circuit Court ofAppeals in Boston
ruled that the DEA could not use lack ofFDA approval as the basis for their argumem
that MDMA/Ecstasy had no medically accepted use.[45] Grinspoon won his case.
However, despite this ruling, the DEA proceeded to permanently place MDMA/Ecstasy
in Schedule I on March 23, 1988.[7; 50 p.15-16]
Interestingly, also in 1988, after the hearings and aiter MDMA was placed in
Schedule I, a related law suit was brought to the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals and the
court found that Administrator Lawn overstepped his powers when he placed
MDMA/Ecstasy in Schedule I on an emergency basis in 1985. The court held that the
Attorney General never properly delegated to the DEA Administrator the power to
temporarily schedule substances.[7; 127]
Following the scheduling ofMDMA in the mid-1980s and all its associated media
attemion, the recreational use ofthe drug increased. The social phenomenon ofall night
dance parties, known as "raves," began. Raves are electronic music evems with light
shows, laser shows, and psychedelic image screens that usually run from late night umil
the following morning. Some place the beginning ofraves on the Spanish Isle of lbiza in
the summer of 1987.[50 p. 17] The phenomenon was brought to England in the summer
of 1988 when raves took place outdoors with thousands in attendance, with an increasing
number taking MDMA/Ecstasy.[50 p. 17] The rave phenomenon was exported to the
United States, first in New York and San Francisco, then to many cities across the
country, then throughout Europe, Australia and Asia.[50 p. 18] Worldwide consumption
ofMDMA/Ecstasy grew exponentially.[50 p. 18]
Pharmacology of MDMA/Ecstasy
At this point it would be useful to look at the pharmacology and neurobiology ofthis
drug. The pharmacology ofMDMMEcstasy involves two brain chemicals,
predominamly serotonin and to a lesser extent dopamine.[113 p. 1490] They are both
neurotransmitters, chemical agems that transmit a nerve impulse across a synapse, the
microscopic space between two nerve cells. Nerves communicate with each other by
both electrical and chemical means. An electrical impulse carries a signal along the
length ofthe neuron. At the end ofthe neuron is the synapse. The electrical impulse
cannot cross the synapse. Instead, the signal is carried across the space by a chemical,
the neurotransmitter. The chemical is stored in the pre-synaptic neuron. Once released it
crosses the synaptic space and binds on the post-synaptic neuron, on sites known as
receptors. The receptors then cause induction ofa new electrical signal that is
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transmitted down the nerve. The neurotransmitter is thus a means ofpropagating a nerve
impulse. The neurotransmitter not only binds post-synaptically but also binds pre-
synaptically to function as negative feedback to inhibit release ofmore neurotransmitter.
In addition, the neurotransmitter undergoes reuptake into the pre-synaptic nerve, to be
stored for future use. These mechanisms ofrelease, post-synaptic receptor binding, pre-
synaptic negative feedback and reuptake, comprise a complex process. They are part of
the mechanism by which the central nervous system functions and they are susceptible to
numerous hormonal as well as other endogenous and exogenous chemical comrols.
Psychoactive drugs function by altering this complex system.
MDMA/Ecstasy acts on the serotonin neurotransmitter system in two ways. It
induces serotonin release from the pre-synaptic nerve and it blocks serotonin re-
uptake.[113 p. 1490] The net effect is more serotonin in the synapse and thus more
stimulation ofthe post-synaptic serotonin receptors. MDMA/Ecstasy may also have a
direct stimulant effect on these receptors.[113 p.1490] Serotonin is involved in the
regulation ofa variety ofbehavioral functions including mood, anxiety, aggression,
appetite and sleep.[113 p. 1490] MDMA/Ecstasy acts on another neurotransmitter,
dopamine, by inducing dopamine release into the synapse.[113 p.1490] Dopamine is the
primary neurotransmitter ofthe "reward pathway" and is involved in motivational
processes such as reward and reinforcement.[113 p. 1490] MDMA/Ecstasy likely has
other effects, not yet determined. MDMA/Ecstasy is considered to be the prototype ofa
new class ofdrugs referred to as "empathogens" (empathy producing) or "emactogens"
(touching within).[50 p.22; 113 p. 1490] MDMA/Ecstasy produces feelings ofeuphoria
and well being. It also produces mild changes in perception but does not cause
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hallucinations or psychosis at doses used therapeutically, prior to 1985 when therapeutic
use became illegal, or at the usual recreational dose used today.[113 p. 1491 ]
Acute Morbidity and Mortality in MDMA/Ecstasy Users
As recreational use has grown, acute effects ofMDMA/Ecstasy have gained a lot of
media attemion and are the basis ofsome ofthe concern for the safety ofpeople using
MDMA/Ecstasy at raves. These acute effects are separate from the possible longer-term
neurological, psychological and psychiatric effects. All MDMA/Ecstasy bought for
recreational use is bought on the black market, produced illegally and consequently has
no quality control in terms ofdose and adulterants. Accepting that, the acute physiologic
effects ofMDMA/Ecstasy are generally related to its stimulant effects that increase heart
rate, blood pressure, body temperature, muscle activity and sweating.[113 p. 1494]
Couple these effects with the prolonged aerobic activity ofdancing for many hours in
often poorly ventilated dance venues, and the result is the acute morbidity and mortality
associated with MDMA/Ecstasy use. One ofthe most serious and potentially fatal
complications of its use in the rave setting is elevated body temperature, known as
hyperthermia. The sequelae ofhyperthermia, such as central nervous system damage,
dehydration and rhabdomyalysis (muscle breakdown) with consequent seizures, kidney
failure, and disseminated intravascular coagulation (activation ofblood clotting
mechanisms within the vascular system), are the cause ofmuch ofthe morbidity and
mortality that is associated with MDMMEcstasy use.[ 11; 50 p.73-73] In the setting of
prolonged aerobic activity such as raves, this problem is exacerbated by blunting (due to
the effect ofMDMA/Ecstasy as well as other recreational drugs and alcohol) ofthe
normal human response to this situation, which is rest, fluid replacemem and moving to a
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cooler environmem.[50 p.73-74] In other words, hyperthermia and its complications are
largely setting dependem and therefore prevemable. Appropriate precautions can prevem
much ofthe morbidity and mortality ofhyperthermia just as an athlete avoids them by
proper fluid and electrolyte replacemem, appropriate pacing ofaerobic activity and
adequate ventilation and cooling.
Serotonin syndrome is an idiosyncratic and serious effect that can result from
excessive central and peripheral nervous system stimulation by serotonin. Manifestations
of serotonin syndrome include altered mental status (agitation, confusion, delirium,
coma), seizures, muscle hyperactivity, as well as autonomic nervous system dysfunction
including abdominal pain, diarrhea, sweating, elevated temperature, elevated blood
pressure and heart rate, flushed skin, dilated pupils, salivation and shivering.[ 11
Serotonin syndrome can be fatal but it is a rare evem in MDMA/Ecstasy users.
Another danger, also rare, is hyponatremia (low blood sodium levels). This can be
caused by drinking pure water void of electrolytes for fluid replacemem, as well as a
neuro-hormonal effect ofMDMA/Ecstasy that leads to SIADH, Syndrome of
Inappropriate Anti-Diuretic Hormone, and consequent fall in the blood sodium levels.[50
p.75-76] Hyponatremia has been implicated in some deaths from MDMA/Ecstasy
use.[50 p.76]
The Neurotoxicity Controversy
Concurrem with the exponemial growth ofrecreational MDMA/Ecstasy use,
considerable research into the drug’s effects on the cemral nervous system has been
conducted. This research is controversial with many questions arising as to the effects of
MDMA/Ecstasy on the brain, on cognitive function and on mood disorders. No clear
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answers have emerged on these issues. These studies are at the center ofthe
neurotoxicity controversy and subsequem political controversy surrounding
MDMA/Ecstasy. The neurotoxicity comroversy involves the validity ofmany
MDMA/Ecstasy studies. A detailed critique ofthe scientific, psychological and
psychiatric studies ofMDMA/Ecstasy is beyond the scope ofthis essay. However, a
brief look at some studies is essemial to an understanding ofthe larger controversy of
MDMA/Ecstasy, particularly in the drug-policy arena. With rare exception, all studies
conducted on MDMA/Ecstasy are done on animals or on human volunteers who have
used the drug recreationally. Because of its Schedule I status, the drug cannot be given to
humans in prospective research protocols. One exception to this is a study done by
Charles Grob where the drug was administered to volumeers who had substantial
previous recreational exposure to the drug.[31 ]
Studies on MDMA/Ecstasy can be divided into"
1) Animal studies focusing on the question of neurotoxicity.
2) Neurobiological studies in which various measures of neural function are
assessed in human subjects, including measurement ofchemical indicators of
serotonin activity, hormonal response to chemical challenges, brain imaging,
and cerebral blood flow imaging, all designed to determine neurobiological
function in MDMA/Ecstasy users.
3) Psychological studies looking at cognitive function in MDMA/Ecstasy users.
4) Studies looking at psychiatric disease in MDMA/Ecstasy users.
All these studies attempt to answer questions such as"
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1) Does MDMA/Ecstasy cause changes and/or damage to the serotonin and/or
dopamine systems in the human brain?
2) If there are changes and/or damage, are they dose related? Are they temporary
or permanent?
3) What are the neurological, cognitive and psychiatric consequences of
MDMA/Ecstasy induced changes and/or damage? Are they dose related?
Are they temporary or permanent? Are they latent?
The sciemific and clinical research ofMDMA/Ecstasy focuses on its effects on
serotonin in the central nervous system. Many studies have examined this issue and most
are wrought with comroversy. It is worthwhile to look at this topic briefly. In 2000, an
entire issue ofNeuropsychobiology was devoted to this topic.[80] Six papers are
included in this issue. The first five address one aspect ofthe neurotoxic effects of
MDMA/Ecstasy. The sixth paper is a compilation of fourteen diverse views from a
symposium on MDMA/Ecstasy, each preseming an answer to the question: Is
MDMA/Ecstasy a neurotoxin?
The first paper in the MDMA/Ecstasy issue ofNeuropsychobiology is "(+/-)3,4-
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (’Ecstasy’)-Induced Serotonin Neurotoxicity: Studies
in Animals" by George Ricaurte, et al., Department ofNeurology, Johns Hopkins School
ofMedicine.[95] This paper summarizes a number of studies done in animals looking at
various neurochemical, neuroanatomical and functional measures of serotonin neurons.
According to the researchers these studies "provide compelling evidence that MDMA has
neurotoxic potential toward brain 5-HT [serotonin] neurons in animals."[95 p.8] This
conclusion is based on demonstration that MDMA exposure results in decrements in a
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number of serotonin markers and that morphologic studies indicate that the loss of
serotonin is from degeneration of serotonin nerve terminals. Using the technique of
imerspecies scaling, these researches conclude that the dosages that cause neurotoxicity
in animals are in the range used recreationally by humans.
Taken together, these preclinical findings strongly suggest that MDMA produces
toxic effects on brain 5-HT [serotonin] neurons. The neurotoxic effects of
MDMA have broad species generality. Evidence ofMDMA-induced 5-HT
[serotonin] neurotoxicity has been found in every species that has been tested,
including various nonhuman primate species When each ofthese factors is
considered for MDMA, the conclusion that emerges is that doses ofMDMA that
produce neurotoxic effects in animals are squarely in the range ofthose used by
humans. Thus, f’mdings in animals raise concern that human MDMA users are at
risk of incurring brain 5-HT [serotonin] neural injury.[95 p.9]
The second paper is "(+/-)3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (’Ecstasy’)-Induced
Serotonin Neurotoxicity: Clinical Studies" by Una McCann et al., Department of
Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences and Departmem ofNeurology, Johns Hopkins
School ofMedicine.[67] McCann discusses the data from a study by Ricaurte in 1990
that looked at 5-HIAA (a serotonin metabolite) levels in cerebral spinal fluid (CSF)
obtained by outpatiem lumbar puncture ofMDMA/Ecstasy users compared with a comrol
group ofnonusers:
In sum, existing data indicate that some MDMA users incur brain serotonergic
damage, as indicated by reductions in CSF 5-HIAA and loss of brain 5-HT
[serotonin] transporters. A growing body ofevidence suggests that MDMA-
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induced 5-HT[serotonin] neural injury is associated with functional consequences,
including cognitive abnormalities (particularly memory), neuroendocrine
abnormalities, sleep abnormalities and, possibly, impulsivity. Future studies are
needed to confirm and extend curremly available data, and to better def’me the
relationship between MDMA exposure and development of neurotoxicity It
will also be important to conduct longitudinal epidemiological studies in an effort
to determine whether individuals exposed to MDMA are at a higher risk for
developing neuropsychiatric problems as they age.[67 p. 15]
McCann discusses the method ofpharmacological challenge that has been used in
MDMA/Ecstasy studies in humans. This method takes advantage ofthe hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal axis, a complex mechanism ofhormonal regulation. Serotonin is
involved in the normal regulation ofthe secretion ofvarious hormones; prolactin, cortisol
and growth hormone to name a few. The Ricaurte research group at Hopkins, in
collaboration with researchers from Yale, published a paper in 1989 that showed
"suggestive evidence" ofa blunted response, in MDMA/Ecstasy users, to a challenge of
L-tryptophan, a serotonin precursor.[67] Basically, L-tryptophan is administered and
then hormone levels are measured. The Ricaurte paper did not show a statistically
significam difference in response to L-tryptophan challenge between MDMA/Ecstasy
users and non-user controls, but the results were suggestive of altered neuroendocrine
function in users.[67 p.12] These two papers, the CSF study and the L-tryptophan
challenge, have been harshly criticized and will be discussed later in this essay.
The third paper in the Neuropsychobiology issue on MDMA is "Human Research on
MDMA (3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine) Neurotoxicity: Cognitive and
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Behavioural Indices ofChange" by A.C. Parrott, Departmem ofPsychology, University
ofEast London, U.K.[81 ] This paper concludes:
Drug free Ecstasy users often display cognitive deficits, but these seem to be
limited to a few specific functions. Memory problems were the first to be
reported, and have now been confirmed in several studies from differem research
groups The second area that seems to be effected is impulsivity, which has
been shown to be increased in several studies; moreover it does not seem to be a
general characteristic of all recreational drug users, but is more specific to Ecstasy
users The third area is difficulty in higher cognitive tasks involving strategy
and planning However, in each ofthe above areas, there does seem to be
considerable individual variation, with some users displaying poor cognitive
performance, while others show normal task performance. Moreover, some
studies have found no group differences between the Ecstasy users and controls.
This individual variation is confirmed in the subjective reports, since while some
regular Ecstasy users complain ofcognitive problems, many others do not.[81
p.23]
The fourth paper is "Potential Human Neurotoxicity ofMDMA (’Ecstasy’):
Subjective Self-Reports, Evidence from an Italian Drug Addiction Cemre and Clinical
Case Studies" by Fabrizio Schifano, Addiction Treatment Unit No. 1, Local Health Unit
No. 16, Padova, Italy.[98] This paper gives some clinical case studies as well as a larger
report on polydrug consumers who attended a public health addiction treatment center.
The paper looks at psychopathologic states such as panic disorder, depression, impulse
control disorder, social phobia, bulimia, and psychotic disorders in MDMA/Ecstasy
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users. This paper suggests that longer term/higher dose MDMA/Ecstasy consumers are
at higher risk of developing these psychopathologic disturbances. The paper
acknowledges the complex methodological issues arising from this type of study
including self-reports, polydrug use, lack ofage & sex matched controls, variable content
ofblack market MDMA/Ecstasy and the possibility ofpre-existing psychopathology in
MDMA/Ecstasy users. The paper concludes that the data presemed does not justify any
direct and straightforward conclusions as to the neurotoxicity ofMDMA/Ecstasy.
Nonetheless, they conclude that the data presemed may help interpret the possible
existence ofa relationship between psychiatric disturbance and MDMA/Ecstasy
neurotoxic potential in humans.
The fifth paper, "Is MDMA (’Ecstasy’) Neurotoxic in Humans? An overview of
Evidence and ofMethodological Problems in Research" by H. Valerie Curran,
Departmem ofPsychology, University College of London, U.K., presems an overview of
the evidence ofhuman neurotoxicity ofMDMA/Ecstasy.[28] The paper acknowledges:
"As researchers cannot ’administer’ known doses ofMDMA over specified periods to
people, the evidence in humans ofpossible neurotoxic effects is inevitably indirect and
studies are fraught with methodological difficulties."[28 p.35] This paper outlines the
methodological difficulties as follows"
1) What drug and what dose were taken? This is impossible to determine except
in rare studies. Black market MDMA/Ecstasy has been shown to contain
various amphetamine analogs, ketamine, LSD, dextromethorphan and a range
ofother chemicals.[28 p.38]
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2) How reliable is the drug history? Retrospective accounts ofdrug use rely on
self-reporting as well as on memory. Self-reporting is a methodological
problem. Furthermore, MDMA/Ecstasy may impair memory (this is one of
the hypotheses) and concomitant use ofother memory-impairing drugs
compounds this problem.[28 p.38]
3) The vast majority ofMDMA/Ecstasy users also use other drugs.[28 p.38]
4) Are there differences between MDMA/Ecstasy users and controls other than
the use ofMDMA/Ecstasy? Impulsiveness, sensation seeking and low harm
avoidance may be pre-existing traits in people who use MDMA/Ecstasy. Are
people with higher levels of aggression and depression using MDMA/Ecstasy
as a form of self-medication?[28 p.39]
5) Clinical studies frequently use the recruitment procedure of self-presemation
at psychiatric or drug services or volunteers responding to advertisemems.
These methods likely introduce unknown bias.[28 p.39]
The sixth and final paper ofthe Neuropsychobiology issue on MDMA/Ecstasy is a
compilation ofanswers to the question "Is MDMA a Human Neurotoxin?"[121 ] This
question was posed to discussants at a symposium on MDMA/Ecstasy. The respondents
consisted of authorities from the United States, Europe and Australia and represented
experts from various fields such as animal neuroscience, human cognitive testing, police
pathology science, psychotherapy and psychiatry. Most ofthe viewpoints expressed are
represemative ofthe wide range ofopinion on MDMA/Ecstasy neurotoxicity that has
already been discussed above. However, Madhu Kalia, Department ofMolecular
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Pharmacology and Anesthesiology, Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, PA, raised
one issue not mentioned in other papers or by other discussants:
In order to accurately evaluate the possible effects ofthese agents [agems that
interact with serotonin] on brain structure and function, it is necessary to use
standardized and validated biological measures. Merely measuring the degree
and duration ofdepletion of 5-HT [serotonin] and its metabolites is of little value
in determining neurotoxicity because those depletions are part ofthe
pharmacologic profile ofthese agents and are not indicators of"brain toxicity" or
"brain damage." Classical, robust, validated biological measures ofneurotoxicity
include" neurodegeneration and gliosis which are routinely used in evaluating
animal and human tissue There is no evidence that MDMA... produce[s]
neurotoxicity in animals when gliosis is used as a validated measure [O’Callaghan
and Miller, 1994].[121 p.45]
Gliosis is def’med as "the production ofa dense fibrous network ofneuroglia; includes
astrocytosis, which is a proliferation of astrocytes in the area of a degenerative
lesion."[30] Kalia thus questions the validity of all studies ofMDMA neurotoxicity
because none have used the validated standard for demonstration of neural degeneration,
which is gliosis in the degenerated tissue.
This last paper concludes by acknowledging the methodological weaknesses ofthe
human data, but notes: "Sciemific evidence in many topics ofpractical concem is replete
with methodological uncertainties, but sciemists still have to weigh up all the evidence-
and offer their best estimates for what it all means!"[121 p.48] This paper concludes by
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poiming to the increasing body ofevidence for some behavioral, psychobiological and
neurological deficits in recreational MDMMEcstasy users.
The Political Controversy
Recreational drug use, with all of its moral and health concerns, is one aspect ofthe
MDMA/Ecstasy issue that has led to political controversy. There is another aspect to the
issue. In the late 1970s, MDMA/Ecstasy was resurrected by chemist Sasha Shulgin and
introduced into the psychotherapy community in California.[50 p.12] MDMA/Ecstasy
was felt to have enormous potential for treatment ofmemal illnesses. Since the
scheduling ofMDMA/Ecstasy in 1985, psychotherapeutic use, as well as human research
ofthis use, has ceased. Proponents ofthe psychotherapeutic use ofMDMA/Ecstasy have
been among the strongest advocates ofreconsideration of Schedule I placemem. Charles
Grob, a professor ofpsychiatry and pediatrics at Harbor/UCLA Medical Center in Los
Angeles, has been one ofthe most vocal proponents ofresearch into the therapeutic use
ofMDMA/Ecstasy. His paper, "Deconstructing Ecstasy: The Politics ofMDMA
Research" discusses the potential therapeutic use ofthe drug:
Early scientific investigators.., were struck by MDMA’s capacity to help people
open up and talk honestly about themselves and their relationships, without
defensive conditioning appearing. For several hours anxiety and fear appeared to
melt away, even in subjects who were chronically constricted and apprehensive.
Hailed as "penicillin for the soul," MDMA was said to be useful in treating a
wide range ofconditions including post-traumatic stress, phobias, psychosomatic
disorders, depression, suicidality, drug addiction, relationship difficulties and the
psychological distress ofterminal illness. [46 p.551]
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Grob is critical ofthe Schedule I placement and consequent unavailability ofthe drug
to be rigorously studied in controlled prospective clinical research designs. He has been
particularly aggressive in uncovering methodological flaws in the animal and
neurobiological studies ofMDMA/Ecstasy that are used to support claims of
MDMA/Ecstasy neurotoxicity. Grob discusses this topic in detail in his paper.[46] At
the center ofthe comroversy on MDMA/Ecstasy neurotoxicity is the governmem-funded
research ofGeorge Ricaurte at John Hopkins School ofMedicine. Ricaurte started his
MDMA/Ecstasy research while a graduate studem at the University of Chicago.[46
p.562-63] He is the lead author on the paper titled "Hallucinogenic Amphetamine
Selectively Destroys Brain Serotonin Nerve Terminals: Neurochemical and Anatomical
Evidence".[91] This study played a key role in the DEA placement ofMDMA/Ecstasy in
Schedule 1.[46 p.562]. This study used MDA (methylenedioxyamphetamine), not
MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine). The two drugs are analogs. The
f’mdings were used to implicate MDMA since it is an analog ofMDA.[50 p.14-15; 78]
Ricaurte has published a large number ofMDMA studies, most funded by the federal
governmem, and he is a proponent ofthe neurotoxicity ofMDMA/Ecstasy. In 1990 he
published a paper that looked at a primary metabolite ofMDMA (5-HIAA) in the
cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) ofMDMA/Ecstasy users versus a comrol group (this paper
was discussed above, p. 15).[92] Grob reveals a major methodological flaw in this
study.[46 p.571 ] The control group was composed ofchronic pain patiems. Because
chronic pain is known to induce increased levels of serotonin and therefore increased
levels ofCSF 5-HIAA, this places the f’mdings of comparatively low levels ofCSF 5-
HIAA in MDMA/Ecstasy users in doubt. Another study from the Ricaurte group was
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published in 1989.[82] The study used L-tryptophan challenge to demonstrate a
decreased neurohormonal response in MDMA/Ecstasy users (this paper was also
discussed above, p. 16). The results were not statistically significam but suggested a
reduced response to L-tryptophan challenge in MDMA users. A serious flaw in this
study is pointed out by Grob: The MDMA/Ecstasy subjects used in this study were pre-
selected from the CSF 5-HIAA study on the basis ofbeing at the low end ofthe CSF 5-
HIAA spectrum.J46 p.572] Both the L-tryptophan study and the CSF-5HIAA are
regularly cited as evidence ofMDMA/Ecstasy neurotoxicity (see the McCann article in
the Neuropsychobiology MDMA issue published in 2000[67]).
Ricaurte and McCann are both from Hopkins and have received considerable
amounts of federal funding for their MDMA research (estimated to be at least ten million
dollars).[ 119] Their research on MDMA cominues today. In a study published in a 2002
issue ofScience, Ricaurte claimed that a single dose ofMDMA/Ecstasy, in the amount
that a recreational user may use in one night, might cause permanem brain damage
manifest as Parkinson’s Disease.[93] This study was harshly criticized in the sciemific
community.[74; 134] The study used injections ofMDMA in monkeys, a method
criticized because injection use leads to higher blood levels than oral recreational
use.[ 134] The study results were alarming: 20% ofthe animals in the study died, others
showed significant effects on the dopamine system that had not previously been seen
with for MDMA. (MDMA has been shown to affect the serotonin system.) Colin
Blakemore, professor ofphysiology at Oxford University and head ofBritain’s Medical
Research Council, and Leslie Iverson, professor ofpharmacology at King’s College and
Oxford University, both criticized the paper; both were involved in lengthy e-mail
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exchange about the paper with Donald Kennedy, the editor-in-chiefof Science, shortly
after the paper was published; neither believed the paper should have been
published.[134] Blakemore said ".. 40% ofthe animals given supposed MDMA at a
’common recreational dose’ were found to be dead or dying [P]olice [in the U.K.]
estimate that one million young people take Ecstasy each weekend, yet there are only a
few deaths each year."[134] Stephen Kish, a neuropatholigist at the Center for Addiction
and Health in Toronto and a Parkinson’s Disease researcher, wrote "There is no
epidemiological evidence that parkinsonism or any neurological abnormality, with the
possible (but as yet unproven) exception of mild memory loss, is a persistem (momhs to
years atter last use) consequence ofexposure to Ecstasy, a drug that has been used widely
worldwide."[3]
This study was cited by Asa Hutchinson, Administrator ofthe DEA at the time, in
congressional testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism and Homeland Security, on October 10, 2002 in support ofthe RAVE Act.[52]
This legislation will be discussed in more detail in Section II ofthis essay.
In September 2003, Ricaurte retracted the 2002 Science paper.[94] He reported that
the drug used in the 2002 Science study was actually MDA, not MDMA. He has since
retracted another paper for the same reason, inadvertent use ofthe wrong drug.[31 ] His
retractions have fueled the fire ofpolitical comroversy surrounding the MDMA/Ecstasy
issue, especially because the original Science study was used in congressional testimony
in support ofthe RAVE Act, which has since been signed into law by Presidem Bush.
The retractions have fueled controversy in the sciemific community as well. Colin
Blakemore, who criticized the paper prior to the retraction, demanded an independent
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inquiry be conducted into the affair, including disclosure ofthe paper’s referee reports;
"The more I looked at it the more I felt there was an agenda."[101 ] He complained to the
editor-in-chiefofScience of "flaws so radical, so deep, they would have been picked up
by any referee I am very concerned about drug use, but the way to tackle it is not to
misrepresem sciemific evidence What’s going to be the impact ofthese studies?
Young people won’t believe anything they read."[ 101 ] Leslie Iverson called the incident
"an outrageous scandal."[134] Iverson has also said: "It’s another example of a certain
breed of sciemist who appear to do research on illegal drugs mainly to show what the
governmems want them to show. They extract large amoums of grant money from the
governmem to do this sort of biased work."[134]
Ethan Nadelmann, Executive Director ofthe Drug Policy Alliance, commemed on the
retraction: "This is a particularly bold example ofthe corruption that permeates federally
funded research on illicit drugs."[119] Marsha Rosenbaurn, Director ofthe Alliance’s
Safety First Project, commemed "This is high class Reefer Madness When young
people see this kind ofthing, they start to assume they’re being lied to about everything-
including the most important information about their safety."[ 119] An editorial in Nature
about the incidem commemed that "Some observers.., have questioned NIDA’s ability
to maintain its independence in the face ofthe immense pressures brought to bear by
those who stand behind America’s interminable war on drugs."[38] Eric Sterling,
counsel to the Congressional Judiciary Committee (responsible for anti-drug legislation)
during the Reagan administration and curremly presidem ofThe Criminal Justice Policy
Foundation, commemed in a speech at the University ofVirginia in April, 2004" "Drugs
serve an extremely useful role in the theater ofpolitics The govemmem is utterly
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committed to lying about the harmfulness ofdrugs."[55] The Nature editorial concluded
by referring to the original Science paper and its retraction as "one ofthe more bizarre
episodes in the history ofdrug research."[38]
In "Deconstructing Ecstasy" Grob points out that Ricaurte’s group has been further
criticized for a 1998 study published in Lancet that showed by means ofPET scan
imaging that there is evidence ofneural injury in the brains ofMDMA/Ecstasy users.[46
p.575; 68] The study compared a group of fourteen users ofMDMA/Ecstasy with a
second group of fiiteen comrols who had never used the drug. The users reported, on
average, 228 occasions ofMDMA/Ecstasy use, 6 times per month over 4.6 years. They
unarguably represem heavy users ofMDMA/Ecstasy. The technique used for PET scan
imaging involved injection ofa radioactive marker that selectively binds to serotonin
transporters. Other brain imaging researchers have criticized the imaging technique used
in this study as well as the design and data interpretation ofthe study.[72] The key
finding reported in the study was that the users showed decreased global and regional
brain serotonin transporter binding compared with comrols and the authors concluded
that the study showed "direct evidence ofa decrease in a structural component ofbrain 5-
HT [serotonin] neurons in human MDMA users."[68] Images showed dark areas where
there was decreased marker binding. Grob points out that closer examination ofthe
design and data interpretation reveals problems.[46 p.575-77] The data chart provided
shows little difference between the users and comrols; only one MDMA/Ecstasy user
falls well outside the range ofthe rest ofthe subjects. Excluding that one individual, all
ofthe remaining users are within the same range as controls. Two users are near the top
ofthe control range and above the majority ofcontrols. Grob points out a third serious
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problem with this study: What does reduction of serotonin transporter mean?[46 p.578]
Does it mean damage or might it simply be a reflection of functional adjustmem in
response to lower neurotransmitter levels? Recall that Kalia raised this point, that
alteration ofthe serotonin system is part ofthe pharmacologic profile ofMDMA/Ecstasy.
(see p. 19) Dr. Marc Laruelle, a Columbia University PET scan specialist, criticized this
study ofRicaurte’s as "something to put under the rug."[72] He cites a German PET
scan study ofMDMA/Ecstasy users that showed modest decreases in serotonin with
return to normal within six weeks.[72]
Furthermore, this particular study is important in the MDMA/Ecstasy controversy for
the following reason: After publication in the highly regarded British Lancet, the Times of
London reported "ProofThat Ecstasy Damages the Brain" and the media announced
these fmdings around the world.[46 p.575] NIDA then used the Lancet paper as the basis
of its $42 million club drug campaign. "Plain Brain/Brain after Ecstasy," and pictures of
"holes in the brain" were printed on hundreds ofthousands of cards for distribution, in
NIDA publications and on the Web site.[31; 72] The images used from the Lancet study
portrayed the dark areas ofdecreased serotonin transporter binding as "holes in the brain"
from MDMA/Ecstasy use.[31 ] Images from the extremes ofthe user and comrol groups
were used for dramatic effect. The club drug campaign image "wasn’t even an accurate
representation ofthe data in the Lancet article ifthat data had actually been valid."[31 ]
In a March 2001 educational program about drugs on "In The Mix", a Public
Broadcasting Services program for teens, Alan Leshner, Director ofthe NIDA stated:
"We’ve heard people talk about Ecstasy causing holes in the brain and ofcourse that’s a
bit ofan exaggeration..."[31 ]
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Another MDMA/Ecstasy study that utilized brain imaging has been misrepresemed in
the War on Drugs. Rick Doblin, Harvard trained public policy analyst and founder ofthe
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS), discusses this study in
"Exaggerating MDMA’s Risks to Justify A Prohibitionist Policy".[31 ] Only three basic
Phase 1 prospective studies ofhuman volunteers to study the effects ofMDMA in the
hospital research setting have been done in the United States; Chang and Grob did one of
them at Harbor-UCLA Medical Cemer in California.[17; 46 p.559] The 10 subjects in
this study were scanned using MRI and SPECT brain scans at baseline and again after
receiving two doses ofMDMA/Ecstasy, at intervals ranging from two weeks to three
months after the last dose of drug.[ 17] Subjects scanned at two weeks showed some
reduction in cerebral blood flow while those scanned at three momhs showed return to
baseline.[ 17] The subjects used in this particular study were part ofa larger group
participating in Grob’s Phase 1 study, a study in which the FDA required all subjects to
have already had substantial MDMA/Ecstasy exposure.[31 ] Testifying before the Senate
Subcommittee on Governmem Affairs on July 30, 2001, NIDA Director Alan Leshner
showed a large poster with images from this study.[64] The two images showed the
cerebral blood flow at baseline and then in the same subject 2 weeks post
MDMA/Ecstasy administration.[64] The second image showed a decrease in cerebral
blood flow in some areas ofthe brain compared with the first image.[64] Leshner told
the legislators that MDMA/Ecstasy causes changes in cerebral blood flow. In fact, the
same subject scanned at 2-3 months post MDMA/Ecstasy administration showed return
to baseline blood flow. Chang’s study concluded: "low dose recreational MDMA use
does not cause detectable persistent rCBF [regional cerebral blood flow] changes in
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humans.[17 p. 15] Leshner’s statemem to legislators was clearly misleading. Most
importantly, the baseline image that Leshner implied was a non-MDMA/Ecstasy user was
actually a heavy user, since all the study subjects had used MDMA/Ecstasy an average of
211 times.[17 p. 17] This testimony, as well as others, was important in the enactment of
drug policy legislation, specifically the RAVE act, which will be discussed in more detail
in Section II ofthis paper.
Neuropathologist Stephen Kish has claimed, "There are no holes in the brains of
ecstasy users And if anyone wants a straightforward answer to whether ecstasy
causes any brain damage, it’s impossible to get one from these papers."[24] Laruelle,
from Columbia University, commented" "All the papers [brain imaging studies in
MDMA/Ecstasy users] have very significant limitations that make me uneasy."[24]
Andrew Parrott, at the University ofEast London, conducted a study that found
MDMA/Ecstasy outperforming non-users in certain cognitive task tests.[24] In an April
2002 New Scientist article, Parrott is quoted: "It’s an open secret that some teams have
failed to fmd deficits in Ecstasy users and had trouble publishing the fmdings The
journals are very conservative It’s a source of bias." [24] Parrott himself has had
two papers that failed to fmd deficits in MDMA/Ecstasy users tumed down for
publication. [24]
In an interesting twist in the MDMA/Ecstasy comroversy, Ricaurte is an author on a
2004 study in Neuropsychopharmacology using laboratory primates (monkeys) that were
allowed to self-administer oral doses ofMDMA, a study design more closely resembling
human use ofMDMA/Ecstasy and a design not previously used.[59] Atter eighteen
months of self-administration, consuming a total 120-139 doses ofMDMA, followed by
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two momhs ofabstinence, the animals were studied by PET scan and then euthanized and
the brain tissue was studied for serotonin and dopamine toxicity. The brain scans as well
as the tissue examination did not show any evidence ofbrain damage.[59]
Since placemem ofMDMA/Ecstasy in Schedule I in 1985, the psychotherapy
community has aggressively sought to get approval to study the drug in prospective
clinical trials. In March 2004, atter 20 challenging years, this was f’mally accomplished.
Dr. Michael Mithoefer, sponsored by the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic
Studies, received f’mal approval in the form ofa DEA Schedule I license to begin a
prospective clinical study ofMDMA in humans. The study began in early 2004 in South
Carolina and is using the drug in patiems with post traumatic stress disorder.[ 136] This is
the first U.S. prospective study in humans, using MDMA in patients never exposed to the
drug, since MDMA was placed in Schedule I in 1985.
Some conclusions that can be drawn regarding scientific research on MDMA/Ecstasy:
1) Studies ofMDMA/Ecstasy are fraught with methodologic flaws.
2) Media representations ofthe studies exaggerate the toxicity of
MDMA/Ecstasy.
3) Misrepresentation of both valid and flawed study results are used in
congressional testimony to form drug policy that serves to escalate the
increasingly comroversial War on Drugs.
4) Federally funded research on illicit drugs represems a conflict of interest
because the federal government represents the executor ofthe U.S.
prohibitionist drug policy.
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5) 1-4 all contribute to difficulty in investigating legitimate medical use of
MDMA.
SECTION II" THE HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG POLICY
Current U.S. drug policy has its origins in the early twentieth century. A brief look
back at some key pieces of legislation and court cases reveals the roots of America’s
current prohibitionist stand on psychoactive drugs.
The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914
A look at the history of opium is important in understanding the origins of U.S. drug
laws. The milky fluid extracted from the ovary of the poppy plant is a narcotic and is
known as opium.[48] The word opium derives from the Greek word for the juice of a
plant, opos, or opion meaning "poppy juice."[48; 79] The first known written source that
mentions opium is the works of Theophratus in the third century B.C.; clearly man has
known of opium and its effects for a long time.[48] In 1680 the English doctor
Sydenham wrote, "Among the remedies which it has pleased Almighty God to give to
man to relieve his sufferings, none is so universal and so efficacious as opium."[48]
In the eighteenth century opium became a popular recreational drug in China.[71 In
1729 the Emperor, disturbed by this use, decided that opium must no longer be imported
into China except under license.J71] The British had the monopoly on the opium trade in
China, and through the East India Company, began smuggling opium into China via
merchant ships from India.[48; 71] In 1830 a British House of Commons committee
investigated the East India Company and recommended that it would not be desirable "to
abandon so important a source of revenue," and thus the British opium trade
continued.[71 ] Opium addiction in China reached all social classes.[71 ] Emperor Tao-
Kwang took the throne in 1820; he lost 3 sons to opium addiction and was determined to
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put an end to opium smuggling.[71 ] His efforts led to the Opium Wars between Britain
and China, the first in 1839, the second in 1856.[71] The British prevailed in both of
these conflicts. By 1860 the British had what they wanted, legal importation ofopium on
paymem ofduty. Opium use in China rose drastically.[71]
In 1898, at the end ofthe Spanish-American War, the United States annexed the
Philippines.[48] The colonial administrators were disturbed by the high rate ofopium
smoking in the Philippines.J48] Many ofthese administrators were religious leaders and
they opposed opium use on moral grounds.[48] Comemporaneous with this Philippine
concern, the temperance movemem was in full force in the United States. This was a
powerful movement ofreligious fundamentalism that favored abolition of drug and
alcohol use in the United States. Reverend Charles Brent, an Episcopal bishop assigned
to the Philippines, investigated the opium matter.[12 p.44] He learned that opium
imports to the Philippines were part of international opium trafficking.[12 p.44] The
U.S.-sponsored Brent Commission recommended that narcotics be subject to
international rather that merely national control.[12 p.44] Brent convinced the U.S. State
Departmem to call for international conferences dedicated to the eradication of
worldwide drug traffic. [ 12 p.44]
In addition to the moral element, there was an economic component in this initiative.
This was a time when the United States was changing its isolationist foreign policy in
favor ofan increased role in world affairs.[12 p.44] America warned to sell its products
in China, but was having trouble breaking into the market: "The silver bullion China was
trading for British opium could be better traded for other, perhaps American,
products."[12 p.44]
34
In 1909, under American pressure, countries with possessions in the Far East met at
Shanghai to hold the Imernational Opium Conference, chaired by Reverend Brent.[12
p.44] This conference laid the foundation for the Opium Conferences at The Hague in
1911, 1912 and 1914.[12 p.44] The result ofthe Hague Conferences was The Opium
Convemion which required signing parties to limit the manufacture, trade and use of
opiates to medical purposes; to close opium dens; to penalize unauthorized possession of
opiates; and to prohibit opiate sale to unauthorized persons.[12 p.44; 25] Reverend Brent
and his supporters understood that America would have to set an example in order to
have credibility in the international efforts to stop drug trafficking.[12 p.44] Dr.
Hamilton Wright, the U.S. Opium Commissioner at the time and the "father ofAmerican
drug laws" enlisted Representative Francis Burton Harrison to introduce legislation in
Congress, the Harrison Narcotics Bill, to comrol the prescription, sale and possession of
narcotic drugs such as opium, morphine, heroin and cocaine (cocaine was erroneously
believed to be a narcotic at this time).[97 sec. 1 ]
At the end ofthe nineteenth and in the early twentieth cemury, much ofthe narcotic
addiction in the United States was "accidental," it resulted from physician prescribed
narcotics and over-the-counter "patent medication."[137] Recognition of"patent
medication" as a source ofaddiction led to the first U.S. federal law to apply to narcotics:
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.[137] This law actually pre-dated the Harrison
Narcotic Bill by a few years, but it did not regulate the sale ofnarcotics in any way; it
required labeling of foods and drugs, to identify the ingrediems.[12 p.43] Prior to this
law "patent medicines," bought over-the-counter, comained narcotics, unknown to the
consumers ofthese medications.[137] They were sold under names such as Ayer’s
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Cherry Pectoral, Mrs. Winslow’s Soothing Syrup, Darby’s Carminative, and Godfrey’s
Cordial.[12 p.4] They were sold as teething syrups, painkillers, cough medicine, for
diarrhea, for "women’s trouble" and various other maladies.[12 p.4] The new federal law
simply required that medication comain labels idemifying the coments so consumers
would know what they were taking. Later amendmems required quantity be stated and
that drugs meet standards ofpurity.[ 12 p.43]
The Harrison Narcotics Act (HNA) was the first piece of legislation that regulated the
prescription and sale ofnarcotic drugs in the United States.[12 p.44-45] This legislation
was importam for the United State’s image at imemational conferences and to fulfill U.S.
obligations under the new Hague Opium Convemion.[12 p.44] Public health and the
moral aspect ofdrug comrol were also factors in this legislation.[12 p.44] The secretary
of state at that time was William Jennings Bryan and he was a man ofprohibitionist and
religious beliefs and a major advocate ofthe HNA.[12 p.44] It is hard to know which of
these factors dominated in the decision to enact this legislation, but the Sixty-Third
Congress ofthe United States passed the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914.[47]
The HNA required registration of narcotic transactions, levied a tax on each, but did
not directly prohibit the use or sale of narcotics. The law specified that certain people
(physicians, demists, veterinarians, pharmacists, employees ofthese people as well as
pharmaceutical industry workers) could possess and conduct narcotic transactions by
virtue oftheir professions.[47] The law specified that physicians, dentists and veterinary
surgeons could prescribe and dispense narcotics "in the course of [their] professional
practice."[47] Professional practice was not def’med and subsequemly became a point of
controversy in the interpretation ofthe law. The law allowed marketing of small
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quantities of narcotics over-the-coumer.[47] However, the law ultimately became the
means to comrol the prescribing of narcotics by physicians.[12 p.44-45] Some pertinem
excerpts from the law:
Section 1 An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal
revenue, and to impose a special tax on all persons who produce, import,
manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or
coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes. [The
tax was initially $1.00 per year.]
Section 2 That it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or
give away any ofthe aforesaid drugs except in pursuance ofa written order ofthe
person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to
be issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner oflmernal Revenue
Nothing in this section shall apply-
(a) To the dispensing or distribution ofany ofthe aforesaid drugs to a
patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under
this Act in the course ofhis professional practice...
(b) To the sale, dispensing, or distributing ofany ofthe aforesaid drugs by
a dealer [pharmacist] to a consumer under and in pursuance ofa
written prescription issued by a physician, demist, or veterinary
surgeon registered under this Act.
Section 6 That the provisions ofthis Act shall not be construed to apply to the
sale, distribution, or giving away, dispensing, or possession ofpreparations and
remedies which do not contain more than two grains ofopium, or more than one-
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fourth of a grain of morphine, or more than one-eighth ofa grain of heroin, or
more than one grain of codeine, or any salt or derivative ofthem in one fluid
ounce...
Section 8 That it shall be unlawful for any person not registered under the
provisions ofthis Act, and who has not paid the special tax provided for by this
Act, to have in his possession or under his comrol any ofthe aforesaid drugs; and
such possession or comrol shall be presumptive evidence ofa violation ofthis
section, and also a violation ofthe provisions of section one ofthis Act: Provided,
That this section shall not apply to any employee ofa registered person, or to a
nurse under the supervision ofa physician, dentist, or a veterinary surgeon
registered under this Act, having such possession or control by virtue ofhis
employment or occupation and not on his own account; or to the possession of
any ofthe aforesaid drugs which has or have been prescribed in good faith by a
physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act;...
Section 9 That any person who violates or fails to comply with any ofthe
requirements ofthis Act shall, on conviction, be fined not more than $2000 or be
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, at the discretion ofthe court.[47]
The immediate effect ofthe HNA was seen quickly as those addicted to narcotics
tumed to hospitals and physicians as the only place to get their drugs.[12 p.45] The
federal government began the practice ofarresting physicians on the charge that
prescription ofnarcotics to addicts violated the HNA.[12 p.45]
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Case Law Interpretation of the Harrison Narcotics Act
Tracing the evolution ofcase law shows how the HNA was the beginning ofU.S.
prohibitionist drug policy. A look at some Supreme Court cases that were decided in the
decade following the passage ofthe HNA illustrates this evolution. Shortly after
enactment ofthe HNA, U.S.v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1915), was argued before the
Supreme Court.[129] The prosecution attempted to make possession ofopium a crime in
violation ofthe HNA. The indictment was made under Section 8 ofthe HNA (see p.37).
There are exemptions delineated in Section 8 such as employees ofregistered persons,
nurses under the supervision ofa physician, demist, or veterinary surgeon, or persons in
possession ofthe prohibited drugs prescribed in "good faith" by a physician, dentist, or
veterinary surgeon properly registered under the law. The defendant in this case, Jin
Fuey Moy, was a physician who issued a written prescription for morphine to Willie
Martin, a narcotic addict. The indictment alleged that Martin was not registered with the
Collector ofInternal Revenue and had not paid the required tax. It further alleged that
the defendam had not issued the written prescription in good faith but knew that the drug
was not being prescribed for medical purposes but to an addict. The question was
whether such possession ofnarcotics by Martin was prohibited by the HNA. The district
court found in favor Jin Fuey Moy. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
decision and confirmed that the HNA was written as a tax law and any moral ends or
regulation ofthe practice ofmedicine should only be reached through the taxing aspect of
the law.
Only words from which there is no escape could warrant the conclusion that
Congress meant to strain its powers almost if not quite to the breaking poim in
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order to make the probably very large proportion of citizens who have some
preparation ofopium in their possession criminal or at least primafacie criminal
and subject to the serious punishment made possible by Section 9. It may be
assumed that the statute has a moral end as well as revenue in view, but we are of
the opinion that the District Court, in treating those ends as to be reached only
through a revenue measure and within the limits of a revenue measure was right.
Approaching the issue from this point ofview we conclude that ’any person not
registered’ in Section 8 cannot be taken to mean any person in the U.S. but must
be taken to refer to the class with which the statute undertakes to deal- the
persons who are required to register by Section 1.[129 p.402]
The decision meam that a patiem who is given a prescription for a narcotic by a physician
is not required to pay the tax because they are not in the class ofpeople required by
Section 1 ofthe statute to register. The decision points out that a "very large proportion
of citizens" have some opium preparation in their possession.[129 p.402] Thus by a 7-2
decision, in 1916, the Supreme Court struck down this early attempt to interpret the HNA
as a law prohibiting possession or use ofnarcotics by addicted individuals with
physician-prescribed narcotics.
This case, however, raised several issues that were to occupy courts for some years in
interpreting the HNA. First, the federal government’s argumem in Jin Fuey Moy
comained the assumption that prescription of narcotics to maintain an addict was not
consistent with "good faith" medical practice and this became the crux ofthe controversy
in subsequem court cases involving interpretation ofthe HNA.[129] Second, another
issue was the question ofwhat constituted maintenance of addiction in terms of quamity
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ofdrugs prescribed.[14; 126; 131; 135] Finally, an issue discussed in Jin Fuey Moy as
well as subsequent cases involving the HNA and the prescribing ofnarcotics to addicts,
was whether the HNA amounted to an unconstitutional federal effort to regulate medical
practice, a power reserved to the states. This issue was the reason the HNA was
constructed as a tax law, because taxation was a legitimate role for the federal
government. The cases discussed below, Doremus, Webb, Behrman, and Lindner, all
agree on the fact that some regulation ofmedical practice resulting from the tax revenue
aspect the HNA was acceptable and within the power ofthe federal governmem, and
therefore constitutional.[14; 126; 131; 135]
Over the next few years the political and social climate in the United States changed
dramatically. World War I was in progress. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, had seized
power in Russia during the Russian Revolution of 1917. On January 16, 1919 the
required number of states ratified the Eighteenth Amendmem to the U.S. Constitution,
which prohibited "the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within,
the transportation thereof into, or exportation thereof from the United States."[39] The
prohibitionists prevailed and alcohol prohibition became the law ofthe land. A
remarkable change in opinion by the Supreme Court is evident in twin decisions handed
down on March 3, 1919, both by a court narrowly divided 5-4. The HNA was construed
as a narcotic prohibition law, prohibiting the prescription of narcotics by physicians to
addicts, in US. v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1918), and Webb et aL v. US., 249 U.S. 96
(1918).
In Doremus, the first count in the indictmem charged that:
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Doremus, a physician, duly registered, and who had paid the tax required by the
first section ofthe Act [HNA] did unlawfully, fraudulemly, and knowingly sell
and give away and distribute to one Ameris a certain quantity of heroin, to wit,
five hundred one-sixth grain tablets ofheroin, a derivative ofopium, the sale not
being in pursuance ofa written order on a form issued on the blank for that
purpose by the Commissioner if Internal Revenue.[126 p.90]
The second count charged that:
Doremus did unlawfully and knowingly sell, dispense and distribute to one
Ameris five hundred one-sixth grain tablets ofheroin not in the course ofthe
regular professional practice ofDoremus, and not for the treatment ofany disease
from which Ameris was suffering, but as was well known by Doremus, Ameris
was addicted to the use ofthe drug as a habit, being a person popularly known as
a "dope fiend," and that Doremus did sell, dispense, and distribute the drug,
heroin, to Ameris for the purpose of gratifying his appetite for the drug as an
habitual user thereof.[126 p.90]
The court cites Jin Fuey Moy: "It may be assumed that the statute has a moral end as
well as revenue in view, but we are ofthe opinion that the district Court, in treating those
ends to be reached only through a revenue measure, was right. The question becomes
have the provisions in question relation to the raising oftax revenue?"[126 p.94] The
provisions of Section 2 ofthe HNA "aim to conf’me sales ofthe drugs to registered
dealers [i.e. pharmacists], and to those dispensing the drugs as physicians and to those
who come to dealers with legitimate prescriptions ofphysicians."[126 p.94] The court
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considered these provisions to have been included in the HNA by Congress specifically
to provide for raising revenue. The court felt the provisions:
tend to diminish the opportunity ofunauthorized persons to obtain the drugs
and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax imposed by federal law
Ameris, being as the indictmem charges, an addict, may not have used this great
number ofdoses [five hundred tablets] for himself. He might sell some to others
without paying the tax, at least Congress may have deemed it wise to prevent such
possible dealings because oftheir effect upon the collection ofrevenue.[126 p.94-
95]
Thus, in Doremus, the Supreme Court found that dispensing narcotics to a heroin addict
is unlawful based on its relation to raising tax revenue. An addict may sell the drugs and
not pay the required tax.[126 p.94]
The second case, also handed down on March 3, 1919, was Webb, 249 U.S. 96
(1918). The opinion ofthe court states:
Webb was a practicing physician and Goldbaum a retail druggist in Memphis. It
was Webb’s regular custom and practice to prescribe morphine for habitual users
upon their application to him therefore. He furnished these ’prescriptions’ not
after consideration ofthe applicant’s individual cases, and in such quantities and
with such direction as, in his judgmem, would tend to cure the habit or as might
be necessary or helpful in an attempt to break the habit, but without such
consideration and rather in such quantities as the applicam desired for the sake of
continuing his accustomed use. Goldbaum was familiar with such practice and
habitually filled such prescriptions.[135 p.97-98]
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It should be noted that the Supreme Court opinion mentions the fact that the quantity of
morphine, both quantity per prescription as well as the number ofprescriptions written by
Webb and filled by Goldbaum, were many times greater than the usual practice for a
physician and for a retail pharmacist.[135 p.98] The court was faced with a question:
If a practicing and registered physician issues an order for morphine to an habitual
user thereof, the order not being issued by him in the course ofprofessional
treatmem in the attempted cure ofthe habit, but being issued for the purpose of
providing the user with morphine sufficiem to keep him comfortable by
maintaining his customary use, is such order a physician’s prescription under
exemption (b) of [Section 2 ofthe HNA]?... to call such an order for the use of
morphine a physician’s prescription would be so plain a perversion ofmeaning
that no discussion ofthe subject is required. That question should be answered in
the negative.[135 p.99-100]
Thus, a physician’s prescribing ofnarcotics to an addict to maintain the addict’s
dependence, at least prescriptions of large quantities, as was the case in Webb, was a
violation ofthe HNA, and therefore a crime. Atter Doremus and Webb, the foundation of
the United States’ abstinence-based prohibitionist drug policy was established. Narcotics
could only be obtained through written prescriptions by a physician and prescription of
narcotics to addicts was not considered good faith practice ofmedicine, and was therefore
criminal under the HNA. After Doremus and Webb, the government continued its
practice ofarresting physicians for prescribing narcotics to addicts.
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The comroversy cominued and over the next few years several more Supreme Court
opinions were handed down. The cases focused on the issue: what constitutes a
prescription issued in good faith by a physician in the course ofprofessional practice?
US. v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1921), decided March 27, 1922, involved the
prescribing of narcotics by a physician, Behrman, to an addict, Willie King[131 ]. The
prescriptions were for large quamities ofopium, heroin, morphine and cocaine. The
court found:
It may be admitted that to prescribe a single dose, or even a number ofdoses, may
not bring a physician within the penalties ofthe [HNA]; but what is here charged
is that the defendant physician, by means ofprescriptions, has enabled one,
known by him to be an addict, to obtain from a pharmacist the enormous number
ofdoses But the quantities named in the indictmem are charged to have been
immsted to a person known by the physician to be an addict, without restraint
upon him in its administration or disposition by anything more than his own
weakened and perverted will. Such so-called prescriptions could only result in
the gratification ofa diseased appetite for these pernicious drugs, or result in an
unlawful parting with them to others, in violation ofthe [HNA] as heretofore
imerpreted in this court, within the principles laid down in the Webb and Jin Fuey
Moy Cases... [131 p.288-89]
Thus, in Behrman, as in Webb, prescriptions for large quantities of narcotics were
considered to be outside the realm ofgood faith professional practice and a violation of
the HNA. However, the opinion in Behrman did suggest that "a single dose, or even a
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number ofdoses" prescribed to an addict may be acceptable professional practice.[131
p.288]
A subsequem case, Lindner v. U. S., 268 U.S. 5 (1924), decided April 13, 1925,
addressed this issue.[14] Charles Lindner, a licensed physician, dispensed to Ida Casey,
an addict, one tablet of morphine and three tablets ofcocaine to be self-administered by
Casey to satisfy her addiction. Casey was not prevented from disposing ofthe drugs in
any manner she chose; she could sell it. The Lindner opinion reviewed previous
Supreme Court decisions: Jin Fuey Moy found that the HNA must be strictly construed
as a revenue measure; Doremus found that the HNA must be construed as a tax law
because that was within the power of Congress, whereas regulation ofmedical practice
was a power reserved to the states, and prescription of large quantities ofnarcotics
violates the HNA in that an addict may subsequemly sell the drugs and avoid paying the
tax; Webb found that a physician’s prescription for large quantities of narcotics to an
addict to maintain his addiction was "so plain a perversion ofmeaning" ofthe word
prescription, that no discussion was required; Behrman validated Webb in that
prescriptions of large quantities ofnarcotics to an addict constituted a violation ofthe
HNA but suggested smaller quantities may not be a violation.[14 p. 18-20] The decision
in Lindner affirmed that the HNA was essemially a revenue measure and as such:
The opinion cannot be accepted as authority for holding that a physician who acts
bona fide and according to fair medical standards may never give an addict
moderate amounts ofdrugs for self-administration in order to relieve conditions
incident to addiction. Enforcemem ofthe tax demands no such drastic rule, and if
the act had such scope it would certainly encoumer grave constitutional
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difficulties Federal power is delegated, and its prescribed limits must not be
transcended even though the end seems desirable. The unfortunate condition of
the recipiem certainly created no reasonable probability that she would sell or
otherwise dispose ofthe few tablets intrusted to her; and we cannot say that by so
dispensing them the doctor necessarily transcended the limits ofthat professional
conduct with which Congress never intended to interfere.[14 p.22]
The decision in Lindner seemed to permit physicians to prescribe narcotics to addicts
as long as it was in small quamities. However, the "Federal Bureau ofNarcotics went
right on arresting doctors for doing so, simply taking the precaution of never bringing
them to trial where they could be acquitted."[85] The Federal Bureau ofNarcotics was
the country’s primary drug law enforcement agency at the time.
Evolution of U.S. Drug Policy 1920- 1970
From the early 1920s until 1970 there were more than fifty pieces of federal
legislation enacted relating to control ofdrugs referred to as narcotics or dangerous
drugs.[60 p.2142] It was a mere thirteen years before the prohibition ofalcohol was
repealed by the Twemy First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1933.[122]
Semiment regarding drug use over the fifty-year period, 1920 to 1970, has varied and has
been dependant on the prevailing social and political climate in the United States and the
world.
After WWII, there was first the enactmem ofmaximum penalties for narcotic use and
then a change in beliefs led to more control by physicians and psychotherapists.[75
p.230] In the early 1950s, at the beginning ofthe McCarthy era, the fear ofthe Soviets,
communism in China, as well as suspicion of all groups perceived as a threat to the
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government led to the 1956 Narcotic Control Act with mandatory minimum sentences on
the first conviction, and the threat ofthe death penalty for drug offenses as well.[75
p.231 ] The death penalty was possible for a person over the age of 18 who sold heroin to
a person under the age of 18.[75 p.231]
The 1960s saw the growth ofthe mental health specialty within the medical
profession.[75 p.234-37] As this medical specialty grew, views on addiction changed;
addiction was viewed more as a medical and mental illness and the leaders ofthe mental
health field felt the medical profession should handle addiction.[75 p.235] This view was
in contrast to that ofthe Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, who viewed drug use and addiction
as a criminal matter. In 1962 the U.S. Supreme Court case Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), dealt with this controversy ofaddiction as an illness rather than a
criminal matter.[96] The defendant was arrested and charged under a California statute
that made it a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonmem, for any person to be "addicted
to the use ofnarcotics." The statute did not deal with the use, purchase, sale or
possession of narcotics, or with amisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their use.
It was a statute that made the "status ofnarcotic addiction" a criminal offense. The
California court upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction:
It is unlikely that any State at this momem in history [ 1962] would attempt to
make it a criminal offense for a person to be memally ill, or a leper, or to be
afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might determine that the general health
and welfare require that the victims ofthese and other human afflictions be dealt
with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confmement, or
sequestration. But, in the light ofcontemporary human knowledge, a law that
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makes a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought
to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishmem in violation ofthe Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. We cannot but consider the statute before us as ofthe
same category. In this Court counsel for the State recognized that narcotic
addiction is an illness. Indeed, it is apparently an illness that may be contracted
innocemly or involumarily. We hold that a state law which imprisons a person
thus afflicted as a criminal.., inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation
ofthe Fourteemh Amendmem Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the "crime" ofhaving a common cold.[96]
In 1963 the Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, created by the
Kennedy administration, issued its report and recommended: relaxation ofmandatory
minimum semences, increased funding for research on drug abuse, and dismantling ofthe
Federal Bureau ofNarcotics with assignment of its functions to the Justice Department
and the Departmem ofHealth, Education and Welfare.[75 p.238] The 1960s also saw the
establishmem ofthe first methadone maintenance clinics in New York City, started by
the pioneering work ofDr. Vincem Dole and Dr. Marie Nyswander.[75 p.237] They
promoted the beliefthat opiate addiction caused a permanem biochemical change in the
brain and therefore maintenance treatment, possibly for life, was the best way to treat
addiction. [75 p.237-38]
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and The
Controlled Substances Act
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 consolidated all
federal drug laws enacted since the HNA of 1914 and created one comprehensive piece
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of legislation.[75 p.241 ] This legislation favored flexible penalties in place ofmandatory
minimums.J75 p.241] The authors ofthe 1970 legislation were concerned that
"increasingly longer semences that had been legislated in the past had not shown the
expected overall reduction in drug law violations."[103 chap.6, sec.C. 1.] There was also
concem that "severe drug laws, specifically as applied to marihuana, have helped create a
serious clash between segments ofthe youth generation and the Government and have
contributed to the broader problem of alienation ofyouth from the general society."[103
chap.6, sec.C. 1.] The 1970 Act eliminated mandatory minimum semences for drug law
violations except for "professional criminals".[103 chap.6, sec.C.1.]
An importam part ofthis 1970 legislation was Title II, The Controlled Substances Act
(CSA).[123] This Act now serves as the legal basis ofthe federal governmem’s
prohibition ofthe use ofcertain drugs, and thus serves as the basis ofthe government’s
prohibitionist drug policy. The CSA places all drugs that are regulated into Schedules I
through V based on specific criteria: 1) potemial for abuse, 2) currently accepted medical
use, 3) safety and potemial for dependence. This law is the basis ofthe scheduling of
MDMA/Ecstasy as well as marijuana in Schedule I, the most restrictive category. Just
aider enactment ofthe 1970 legislation, President Nixon officially declared America’s
War on Drugs. At a press conference on June 17, 1971 Nixon called drug abuse "public
enemy number one in the United States."[116]
Cocaine
In the 1980s public sentiment grew increasingly anti-drug in large part because ofthe
crack cocaine phenomenon. Historically, cocaine use in the United States has fluctuated.
In the late 1800s cocaine was introduced into this country and was widely used through
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the early 1900s.[103 chap.6, sec.B. 1.] After the passage ofthe HNA, non-medical use of
cocaine became illegal. By the 1950s the use ofcocaine had declined and the drug was
no longer considered a problem.[103 chap.6, sec.B. 1.] However, cocaine re-emerged as a
drug of abuse in the 1960s.[103 chap.6, sec.B. 1 .] In the 1980s cocaine use, and more
specifically crack cocaine use, became a major social and political issue.
It is worthwhile to look at cocaine and its various forms because crack cocaine has
played a very significant role in America’s War on Drugs in the last two decades. There
are several forms and methods ofuse for cocaine. The naturally occurring form is the
coca leaf from coca plants. The leaves can be chewed, rolled into cigarettes or cigars and
smoked, or infused in liquid, forming a coca tea.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.a.] Coca paste is a
putty-like substance that is an intermediate product in the conversion ofcoca leaves into
powder cocaine; coca paste is a form ofbase cocaine, the pure form ofthe psychoactive
ingrediem from the coca plant.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.b.] Coca paste does not readily
dissolve in water and hence cannot be injected, sniffed or ingested.[103 chap.2,
sec.C. 1.b.] Most coca paste is converted into powder cocaine although in some South
American countries the paste is smoked.[103 chap 2, sec.C.l.b.] Powder cocaine is the
stable, salt form ofcocaine formed by reacting coca paste with hydrochloric acid,
producing cocaine hydrochloride salt; it is the white odorless crystalline powder that is
the common street drug known as cocaine.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.c.] Powder cocaine is
water-soluble and usually is sniffed.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.c.] Because it is water-soluble it
can also be dissolved and injected.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.c.] Base cocaine is another form
ofcocaine; coca paste is one form ofbase cocaine but there are other forms.[103 chap.2,
sec.C. 1.b.] Base cocaine can be derived from cocaine hydrochloride salt when
51
chemically treated with ammonia and ether or sodium bicarbonate (baking soda).[103
chap.2, sec.C. 1.d.i.] When dissolved in ammonia and ether, a solid substance separates,
the base cocaine, also called "flee-base" cocaine.[103 chap.2, sec.C.l.d.i] This flee-base
cocaine is smoked because it is not water-soluble.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.d.i.] Free-base
cocaine became popular in the 1970s.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.d.i.] Smoking free-base
cocaine carries some risk, independent ofthe drug effect and dependem instead upon its
mode ofpreparation. There is the danger when smoking free-base cocaine that it may
ignite if it is smoked before the ether fully evaporates.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1 .d.i.] This
aspect ofcocaine use received a lot ofmedia coverage in 1980 when comedian Richard
Pryor suffered severe burns while free-basing cocaine.[103 chap.2, sec.C. 1.d.i.]
Crack cocaine is another form ofbase cocaine and is formed by dissolving powder
cocaine in sodium bicarbonate (baking soda).[103 Chap. 2, sec. C.l.d.ii.] The solution is
boiled, a solid substance separates from the solution and is dried and cut into pieces.[103
chap.2, sec.C. 1.d. ii.] The boiling process produces a "cracking’ sound, hence the name
crack cocaine.[54] This crystallized form ofbase cocaine, crack cocaine, is insoluble in
water so it can’t be easily injected or sniffed but it does vaporize at low temperature so it
can be easily inhaled via a pipe.[54]
The onset, intensity and duration ofthe effects ofcocaine differ depending on the
form ofcocaine used and the method ofadministration.[103 chap.2, sec.C.2.] Base
cocaine provides more rapid, more intense euphoria than the powdered salt form. In
other words, crack cocaine is a more potent form than powder cocaine but is none-the-
less still cocaine. Cocaine produces the same physiological effects regardless of its form.
Cocaine has been described in the following way: "... a drug which induces a secular
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parody ofheaven commonly leads the user into a biological coumer part ofhell."[54]
The human brain has negative feedback mechanisms with the functional effect ofmaking
crack-induced pleasure short lived.[54] The "euphoria ofa re-enforcer as uniquely
powerful as crack will be followed by a crash."[54] The crash is manifest as anxiety,
depression, irritability, fatigue and sometimes paranoia.[54] An intense craving for more
cocaine develops and severe depression, agitated delirium and sometimes a condition of
paranoid psychosis can result.[54] There is down regulation ofreceptors in the brain to
compensate for the cocaine induced over stimulation and the brain’s capacity to
experience pleasure is diminished.[54] Profound melancholy and anhedonia are
common.[54] The social consequences ofcrack cocaine can be equally unpleasant" "The
obsession [for the drug] is so all-consuming that food, money, sleep, loved ones,
morality, any sense ofresponsibility and even survival instincts may be eclipsed."[22]
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986: Mandatory Minimums, the Cocaine Ratio, and the
Crack House Statute
The prevailing social and political climate in the United States influenced enactmem
ofdrug policy throughout the twentieth century and this was the case with crack cocaine.
The crack cocaine phenomenon ofthe 1980s and the developing AIDS epidemic played a
large part in new comprehensive drug legislation in 1986.[103 chap.8, sec.B. 1.f.]
Presidem Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 into law on October 27,
1986.[2] Opinion once again shifted in favor ofmandatory semencing. The 1986 Act
created the basic framework ofmandatory minimum penalties, also known as determinate
sentencing, for federal drug offenses that are still in existence today.[103 chap.6,
sec.C.3.]
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The 1986 Act established two tiers ofmandatory prison terms for first-time drug
offenders; five-year and ten-year minimum sentences, triggered exclusively by quantity
and type ofdrug.[103 chap.6, sec.C.3.] Higher mandatory minimum penalties apply if
the offender has been previously convicted ofa drug trafficking offense.[103 chap.6,
sec.C.3.] This law also established the criminal law distinction between powder cocaine
and crack cocaine; the 100-to-l, powder-to-crack, quantity ratio used in determinate
sentencing.[103 chap.6, sec.C.3.] Crack was considered far more serious than powder
cocaine, to the extent that crack in a quantity 1/100 that ofpowder cocaine would trigger
the same penalty. Five hundred grams ofpowder cocaine and five grams ofcrack
cocaine both trigger a five-year mandatory penalty for first offenders.[103 chap.6,
see.C.3.]
The 1995 report to Congress on cocaine and federal sentencing policy, submitted by
the United States Semencing Commission, comains considerable and insightful
discussion ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.[103] The 1986 Act was expedited
through Congress and lei behind a limited legislative record and no committee
reports.[103 chap.6, sec.C.3.a.] "Congress dispensed with much ofthe typical
deliberative legislative process, including committee hearings."[103 chap.6, sec.C.3.a.]
This expeditious development and enactmem is reflected in the congressional record:
It is historic for Congress to be able to move this quickly. Senator Chiles[103
chap.6, sec.C.4, citing 132 Cong. Rec. 31,329 Oct 15, 1986]
I know it seems to some that we are moving too fast and frenetically to pass drug
legislation. Senator Rockefeller [103 chap.6, sec.C.4, citing 132 Cong. Rec.
26,449 Sept 26, 1986]
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Very candidly, none ofus has had an adequate opportunity to study this enormous
package. It did not emerge from the crucible ofthe committee process.- Senator
Mathias [103 chap.6, sec.C.4, citing 132 Cong. Rec. 26,462 Sept. 26, 1986]
In our haste to paste together a drug bill any drug bill before we adjourn, we
run the risk ofending up with a patchwork quilt.., that may not fit together into
a comprehensible whole. Representative Lott [ 103 chap.6, sec.C.4, citing 132
Cong. Rec. 22,658 Sept. 10, 1986]
The media played a significant role in the crack cocaine phenomenon ofthe 1980s.
Citing the drug-related death ofBoston Celtics first round basketball draft pick Len Bias,
members of Congress repeatedly described the drug problem in 1986 as an
"epidemic".[103 chap.6, sec.C.4, citing Senators Joseph Biden (132 Cong. Rec. 26,436
Sept. 26, 1986), Dennis Deconcini (132 Cong. Rec. 26,444 Sept. 26, 1986), Alfonse
D’Amato (132 Cong. Rec. 8,091 June 20, 1986), Mack Mattingly (132 Cong. Rec. 8,092
June20, 1986)] Senator Paula Hawkins spoke in support ofthe 1986 Act" "Drugs pose a
clear and presem danger to America’s national security. If for no other reason we should
be addressing this on an emergency basis This is a bill which has far reaching
impact on the future as we know it as Americans and as we mature into the next century."
[103 chap.6, sec.C.4, citing 132 Cong. Rec. 26,436 Sept. 26, 1986]
The media portrayed crack cocaine as the number one social and political issue ofthe
time. Time magazine called crack cocaine the "Issue ofthe Year" in 1986.[103 chap.6,
sec.C.4.] Newsweek magazine referred to crack cocaine as the biggest news story since
Vietnam and Watergate. [103 chap.6, sec.C.4.] Len Bias’s death in June 1986 was a
major factor in the media frenzy.[103 chap.6, sec.C.4.] The media handling ofthe crack
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cocaine phenomenon may have accurately reflected the situation or the media, at least in
part, may have created the urgency.[103 chap.8, sec.B.] Regardless, crack cocaine was
viewed as a "national epidemic" in 1986.
The legislative history ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 in the Congressional
record comains transcripts ofthe discussions ofcrack cocaine.[103 chap.8] The
Congressional decision to treat crack cocaine differemly fi’om powder cocaine was
deliberate. Conclusions about the dangers ofcrack relative to powder cocaine were based
on specific assumptions:[103 chap. 8]
1) Crack cocaine was viewed as extraordinarily addictive, not only relative to
powder cocaine, but in absolute terms.
2) The physiological effects of crack cocaine were considered especially
perilous, with the potential of leading to psychosis and death.
3) The correlation between crack cocaine use and the commission ofother
serious crime was considered greater than with other drugs.
4) One ofcrack cocaine’s most troubling features is that young people are
particularly prone to using it.
5) Crack’s potency, low cost, and the ease with which it is manufactured,
transported, and administered were all leading to widespread use.
6 ) Crack cocaine was believed to be associated with other public health concerns
such as "crack babies" and HIV transmission.
The 1986 Act created the widely criticized 100-to-l, powder-to-crack cocaine
ratio[ 103 chap.8, sec.A.] Prior to the 1986 Act, the Semencing Reform Act of 1984
established the United States Sentencing Commission.[100] The Commission was
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charged with creating a system ofuniform mandatory sentencing guidelines.[103 chap. 6,
sec.A] This Act abolished parole for defendants sentenced under the guidelines.[103
chap.6, sec.B.2.] The Commission created the concept of"marijuana equivalency."[100]
Marijuana penalties are used as a common standard to which all other drugs are related
mathematically. The 1986 Act established that possession of 5 grams ofcrack cocaine
would trigger the same 5-year semence as 500 grams ofpowder cocaine.[103 chap.6,
sec.C.3.] The currem standards are as follows:[124 p.105-7]
5-Year penalty triggered by: 100,000 grams ofMarijuana
2857 grams ofMDMA/Ecstasy (pre-2001)*
500 grams ofPowder Cocaine
200 grams ofMDMA/Ecstasy (post-2001)*
100 grams ofHeroin
5 grams ofCrack Cocaine
*The currem ratio for MDMA/Ecstasy was established in 2001 pursuant to the
Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of2000.[37] Prior to the 2000 Act, the ratio was 1 gram
MDMA/Ecstasy 35 grams ofmarijuana.[89 p.6] In 2001, the ratio changed to 1 gram
ofMDMA/Ecstasy 500 grams ofmarijuana.[89 p.6] The Commission set the quantity
ofMDMA/Ecstasy that triggers a five-year penalty at an amount twice that ofheroin and
slightly less than half that ofpowder cocaine.
The difference in penalties for different forms ofcocaine has been the focus ofmuch
controversy. The argument against this difference in penalties is that the drug in the two
substances is the same, cocaine. Research has revealed that federal crack cocaine
defendants are disproportionately black: 85% black in 2000 according to the Report to
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Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, May 2002.[90 Executive Summary,
Findings, sec. 4.] This is despite the fact that the majority of crack cocaine users,
approximately two-thirds, are white or Hispanic.[27] This disparity is believed to be the
result ofthe case selection practices by the DEA and U.S. Attorneys Offices.[112; 114
p.5] The net effect ofthe case selection practices and the lower quantity ofcrack cocaine
that triggers mandatory sentencing is a higher rate of incarceration ofAfrican-Americans.
This issue ofdisproportionate application ofdrug laws to minorities will be discussed in
more detail in Section III ofthis essay. The United States Semencing Commission has
recommended three times that the disparity be removed or reduced.[90 Executive
Summary] The 100-to-1 ratio still exists as law today.
It is clear from the above discussion that crack cocaine played a very large and
important role in the writing and enactment ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. It is
interesting to note that the death ofLen Bias, important in the public’s view ofthe crack
cocaine phenomenon ofthe 1980s and in congressional debate on the 1986 Act, and so
highly publicized in the media as a crack cocaine death, was in fact concluded to be
powder cocaine related, based on the forensic investigation, autopsy results and
testimony in the trial ofBrian Tribble, the person charged with supplying the cocaine to
Bias.[103 chap.6, sec.C.4.]
A part ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was re-establishment ofmandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses. This represented a return to the sentencing
philosophy that had been rejected in the passage ofthe Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Comrol Act of 1970 because "increasingly longer sentences that had been
legislated in the past had not shown the expected overall reduction in drug law
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violations."[103 chap.6, sec.C. 1.] In 1986, during the Reagan administration, Eric
Sterling was the lead attorney for the House Subcommittee on Narcotics and helped write
the mandatory minimum drug legislation.[10 2004] Since 1989, he has been presidem of
The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, a private non-profit educational organization
that helps educate the nation about criminal justice problems and works for drug policy
reform.[108] In a January 2004 interview with CBS News Sterling commemed on the
1986 legislation and mandatory minimum sentences: "This has been the worst legislation
I’ve ever been involved with And it’s probably the worst thing I’ve ever done
professionally, as a lawyer. This was the hastiest thing, the most unusual thing I’ve ever
been involved in on Capitol Hill."[10] In August of2003, conservative Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy, a Reagan appointee, addressed the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting: I can accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal
mandatory minimum sentences. In too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are
unwise and unjust."[61 2003] Mandatory minimums are widely criticized as unfair.
They have greatly impacted the criminal justice system and are responsible in part for the
burgeoning U.S. prison population.[114 p.1 ] "These laws require judges to semence drug
offenders many ofthem first-time, nonviolent, low-level offenders to long prison
terms, otten a minimum of 5, 10, or 20 years, without parole."[114 p. 1 ] There are many
problems with these laws. They require application ofthe mandatory minimums to
"conspirators," oiten low-level participants, sometimes only remotely involved in large
drug operations.[114 p.1] The conspirators are sentenced on the basis ofthe total amount
ofdrug involved in the operation.[114 p.1] The only way a federal drug defendam can
reduce a mandatory minimum semence is by providing "substantial assistance" in
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prosecuting other drug offenders.[114 p.2] Low-level offenders often have no
information to offer as substantial assistance, whereas higher-level traffickers often have
much information to offer and a big incentive to give exaggerated or umruthful
testimony: "Ironically, the ’substantial assistance’ exception frequently allows major
drug traffickers to earn semences substamially shorter than the ’mules’ who work under
them simply because the ’kingpins’ have more information to give prosecutors."[114 p.2]
Another criticism of mandatory minimums is that they shift the exercise of discretion,
decreasing that ofjudges, while increasing discretion for prosecutors.[114 p.2] While
giving more discretion to the prosecutors, who are the ones in the position to decide what
charges to bring and when to negotiate the "substantial assistance" sentence reductions,
mandatory minimums decrease a judges ability to consider mitigating factors.[114 p.2]
This shitt is notable because it takes discretion away from judges, those officials charged
with upholding professional impartiality, while granting greater discretion to the
government prosecutors, one party in an adversarial system. Mandatory minimums are
one ofthe most controversial aspects ofcurrent U.S. drug policy.
Part ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was section 856, Establishment of
Manufacturing Operations, which states:
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful to-
1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose ofmanufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance;
2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner,
lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intemionally rein,
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lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the building,
room, or enclosure for the purpose ofunlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a comrolled substance.
(b) Penalties
Any person who violates subsection (a) ofthis section shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment ofnot more than 20 years or a f’me ofnot more than
$500,000, or both, or a f’me of $2,000,000 for a person other than an
individual. [2]
This section ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 became known as the "Crack House
Statute" (CHS). Following passage ofthis law many indictmems were made and prior to
2001 all indictmems under the U.S. Code, Title 21, section 856 (the CHS) involved literal
crack houses, places where drugs were manufactured, stored and used or places where
business owners "commit substantive drug offenses or conspire with those that are
committing drug offenses".[9 p. 1 ] Case law has affirmed the interpretation ofthe CHS in
application to literal crack houses, where the drug operation was the primary purpose of
the business owner, as well as situations where a legitimate business operated and drug
activity occurred in addition to that business. The latter cases have been upheld on
appeal. Two such cases raise some important issues in the interpretation ofthe CHS and
its evemual use, starting in 2001, in the War on Drugs to combat MDMA/Ecstasy use.
Application of the Crack House Statute: U.S.v. Chen and U.S.v. Tamez
In U. S. v. Mei-Fen Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (1990), the defendam, Mei-Fen Chen,
acquired the Della Motel in Houston, Texas, in 1979 and operated it into the late
1980s.[130] During that time the neighborhood around the motel deteriorated and the
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motel became a location used by drug traffickers. Drugs were sold in the parking lot and
the motel was used for storing, selling and using drugs. Chen was indicted under the
CHS, both section 856(a)(1) and (a)(2).
Two important issues discussed in Chen are "purpose" and "knowledge." These are
important in the subsequem application ofthe CHS in MDMA/Ecstasy cases.
Considerable discussion is presem in Chen regarding "purpose" in the comext ofboth
section 856(a)(1) and (a)(2)"
"Purpose" is a word ofcommon and ordinary well understood meaning; it is "that
which one sets before him to accomplish; an end, intemion, or aim, object, plan,
project." Black’s Law Dictionary 1112 (5th ed. 1979). Or, "purpose" is the
"object toward which one strives or for which something exists; goal; aim...
intention.., determination; resolution." The American Heritage Dictionary ofthe
English Language 1062 (4th ed 1970).[130 p.189]
Using these def’mitions the court found:
In examining the plain language ofthe statute, we f’md that the statute is
unambiguous; the phrasefor the purpose of [in 856(a)(1)] applies to the person
who maintains the place for the illegal activity Based on our reading ofthe
statute, 856(a)(2) is designed to apply to the person who may not have actually
opened or maintained the place for the purpose ofdrug activity, but who has
knowingly allowed others to engage in those activities by making the place
"available for use.., for the purpose ofunlawfully" engaging in such activity.
Therefore, under 856(a)(2), the person who manages or comrols the building
and then reins to others, need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug
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related activity take place; rather such activity is engaged in by others (i.e., others
have the purpose). [ 130 p. 190]
The court states: "... any other interpretation would render 856(a)(2) essemially
superfluous. It is well established that a statute should be construed so that each of its
provisions is given its full effect; interpretation which render parts ofa statute inoperative
or superfluous are to be avoided."[130 p.190]
The other issue addressed in Chen is that ofknowledge as an essential element ofthe
offense.J130 p.187] "The purpose ofadding the word ’knowingly’ is to insure that no
one will be convicted for an act done because ofmistake or accident, or other innocent
reason."[130 p. 187] Regarding section 856(a)(1), knowledge is intrinsic in the purpose;
if one has a purpose in doing something then knowledge is assumed to be part ofthat
purpose.[130 p. 189] Regarding section 856(a)(2), knowledge that others are using the
building, room or enclosure for the purpose ofthe illegal activity is required. Chen
claimed ignorance ofthe drug activity at the motel, despite the testimony ofothers that
she was aware ofthe activity. Review ofthe case reveals that not only did Chen have
knowledge ofthe drug activity, she was at least in some way involved in the activity.
Chen had witnessed drug transactions and drug use in the motel rooms; Chen
alerted tenams when she became aware that law enforcement officers planned to
search certain rooms; Chen would encourage the tenants to make drug sales so
that their rein could be paid; Chen stored drugs and drug proceeds for the tenants;
Chen loaned money to the tenants to purchase drugs for resale.[130 p.186]
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Chen also directed an undercover police officer to a man in the parking lot when the
officer inquired at the motel office as to where he could purchase cocaine.[130 p. 185]
The defense of"deliberate ignorance" or "willful blindness" is discussed in Chen:
The element ofknowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proofthat
the defendant deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise have been
obvious to her. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt ofa conscious purpose to
avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated another
way, the defendant’s knowledge ofa fact may be inferred from willful blindness
to the existence ofthe fact.[130 p.187]
Thus, in the case of Chen, the elements ofknowledge and purpose were clearly present;
Chen had knowledge ofthe activity and others had the purpose to use the motel for illegal
activity. Chen’s conviction under section 856(a)(2) was upheld.
US. v. Frank Javier Tamez is another case where an indictment was made under
section 856(a)(2)ofthe CHS and where interpretation ofthe statute was questioned.J128]
In 1987 the DEA began investigating a car dealership in Washington State owned by
Frank Javier Tamez and allegedly used for cocaine trafficking. Tamez was ultimately
indicted and convicted under section 856(a)(2) ofthe CHS, as well as other statutes.
Tamez appealed on the basis that the application ofthe statute was intended to apply to
"crack houses" or drug manufacturing operations.[128 p.773] He claimed that the
building in his case was used as a successful car dealership. He argued that the statute
was not intended to hold liable every person who owns a building where drug activities
are conducted. Tamez cited the short title ofthe statute, "Establishment ofmanufacturing
operations" and a synopsis in the Congressional Record that describes the statute as
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"outlawing operation ofhouses or buildings, so called ’crack houses,’ where ’crack’
cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used."[128 p.773] The appeals court
found:
Tamez ignores the plain language and application ofthe statue. Although the
short title and the Congressional Record synopsis refer to manufacturing and
crack houses, the words ofthe statute clearly imply more expansive coverage.
First, the words ofthe statute are not ambiguous: the statute prohibits allowing the
use of a building for ’manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled
substance.’ There is no reason to believe that this language was intended to apply
only to storage facilities and crack houses. There was evidence that the dealership
was used as a distribution center and this is sufficiem, under the plain language of
the statute, to constitute a section 856(a)(2) violation.[128 p.773]
Tamez fther claimed that he did not intend to use the building for drug activity but
rather as a car dealership. The appeals court rejected this argument, citing Chen, stating
that section 856(a)(2) was intended to apply when it was the purpose ofothers to use the
building for the illegal activity and the owner could not avoid liability on the basis that it
was not the owner’s purpose to engage in illegal activity: "... section 856(a)(2) requires
only that proscribed activity was presem, that Tamez knew ofthe activity and allowed
that activity to cominue."[128 p.774]
In Tamez, as in Chen, the defendant was directly involved in the drug activity.
Testimony in the case revealed that he used dealership cars and employees to transport
drugs, he used drug proceeds to f’mance the dealership, and he used cocaine in his office
at the dealership.[128 p.772] In both Chen and Tamez, the elements ofknowledge and
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purpose were satisfied, knowledge by the defendants and the purpose of others. Also, in
both ofthese cases the defendams were directly involved in the illegal drug activity that
led to indictment and conviction, upheld on appeal, ofviolation ofthe Crack House
Statute, section 856(a)(2)ofthe Ami-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
MDMA/Ecstasy: A Moral Panic?
Crack cocaine was the drug associated with the decade ofthe 1980s. In the late
1980s, MDMA/Ecstasy emerged as a recreational drug and over the course ofthe 1990s
its use increased tremendously in the comext ofthe rave culture, which exploded across
the United States, Europe, Asia and Australia. MDMA/Ecstasy became a major focus of
the federal government’s drug policy. Faced with the rise in MDMA/Ecstasy use, the
federal governmem, through the Drug Enforcemem Administration, initiated efforts to
combat this new recreational drug. DEA agem Michael Braun declared: "from the law
enforcemem side, MDMA, is the biggest threat that [the DEA has] ever faced."[6] The
DEA produced a promotional video, "Ecstasy and Other Club Drugs: Dancing With
Darkness," highlighting the use ofclub drugs at raves:
Lately raves are just a venue for drug purchases. They are.., analogous to a
crack house, in which you go buy the drugs and go out the back door. Although
there’s music being played, and the people at the raves are saying ’I come here for
the music,’ drugs are predominam in these rave clubs I think it is fair to say
that the rapidly expanding use ofthese club drugs by young people is one ofthe
most startling law enforcemem and social issues facing the United States in the
early part ofthe twemy-first century."[ 13]
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The media has sensationalized MDMA/Ecstasy use in the setting ofraves and
electronic music. In his June 2000 congressional testimony before the House Committee
on the Judiciary on MDMA/Ecstasy, Philip Jenkins, professor ofhistory and religious
studies at Pennsylvania State University, invoked the social sciemist’s term "moral
panic." He was referring to societal reaction to an issue that is "massively out of
proportion to the problem at hand."[58 p. 1 ]
In such instances [moral panics], people are reacting less to the matter at hand
(say, a particular drug) than to its cultural or social associations. People may latch
on to a particular issue because it is an acceptable way ofattacking some
perceived threat that cannot be addressed openly. The panic might thus conceal
tensions over age, race or gender. In addition, panics might be exploited by
bureaucratic agencies that stand to gain new resources on the strength ofpublic
fears. Moral panics are socially damaging because they divert resources from
more serious dangers, and also because they can result in over-sweeping laws
which threaten to ruin the lives ofcoumless relatively harmless individuals I
am worried by current claims about the drug MDMA or Ecstasy I want to
argue that the currem wave ofconcern, which seems to be peaking right now
[June 2000], looks like it’s becoming a classic moral panic, based on exaggerated
fears and misused evidence.[58 p. 1
State Palace Theater and Club La Vela
In the late 1990s the DEA adopted a new strategy to deal with the burgeoning use of
MDMA/Ecstasy in the club scene ofthe United States. In 2001 the federal governmem
prosecuted two cases using an unprecedented application ofthe 1986 Crack House
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Statute, using it as the legal weapon in a new offensive in the War on Drugs.[106 p.15,
20-21 ] The CHS was used as the legal basis to indict the owners/operators of music
venues for illegal drug activity by venue patrons, despite efforts by the owners/operators
to prevent illegal drug activity at their businesses.[9 p.2] The two cases where the
government used this approach are the State Palace Theatre and the Club La Vela cases.
They are important in the developmem and enactment ofthe Illicit Drug Anti-
Proliferation Act of2003, commonly known as the RAVE Act.
In both cases DEA agents purchased drugs at music venues but rather than arresting
the drug dealers or the purchasers of drugs, they arrested the managers ofthe clubs and in
one case, the music promoter. In both ofthese cases, the defendams were indicted under
the Crack House Statute, section 856(a)(2) under which it is unlawful to "manage... any
building.., and knowingly and intemionally.., make available for use.., the building.
for the purpose ofunlawfully.., using a comrolled substance."[133] In these two
cases, the defendants were charged because they had knowledge ofdrug use by others at
venues they managed. They were not charged with involvemem in drug trafficking or
drug use in any way.[9] In this respect, these two cases differ from all other cases where
the Crack House Statute has been applied.[106 p.15, 20-21]
A closer look at these two cases reveals serious constitutional issues with the statute
as it is applied in these cases. These cases also provide important background
information regarding the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of2003, the RAVE Act,
which will be discussed later in this essay.
The first indictmem followed a DEA undercover operation that began in January
2000 and resulted in indictments on January 12, 2001.[106 p.8] The defendams were the
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owners ofBarbecue (BBQ) ofNew Orleans, Inc., d/b/a the State Palace Theater.[105]
BBQ ofNew Orleans, Inc., was the lessee ofthe State Palace Theater located at 1108
Canal Street in New Orleans, Louisiana.[105] Robert Brunet was the manager ofthe
theater and an officer in BBQ ofNew Orleans, Inc., and his brother, Brian Brunet, was an
employee and also an officer in BBQ ofNew Orleans, Inc.[105] James Estopinal was a
music event promoter and an employee ofBBQ ofNew Orleans, Inc., and he organized
electronic music events, known as raves, at the State Palace Theatre.[105] Raves have
been associated with MDMA/Ecstasy use. The charge in the State Palace Theater case
was that the defendams knowingly and intentionally made available a building for the use
ofcomrolled substances by others.J19] There was no evidence, nor was it charged, that
the defendams distributed or used comrolled substances themselves.[105; 106 p.8]
Undercover DEA agents purchased MDMMEcstasy from patrons inside the theater in
excess of fifty times.[105] As evidence ofknowledge ofthe use of controlled substances,
the governmem provided the following facts:
1) Available for purchase at the theater were items of"paraphernalia" commonly
used to enhance and support the physiological high caused by MDMA/Ecstasy
such as pacifiers, chemical light sticks and flashing light rings.
2) Since MDMA/Ecstasy use in the rave setting is known to lead to dehydration,
the defendants sold bottled water and provided "chill rooms" where patrons
could cool down.
3) The defendams provided on-site ambulance service to transport patrons in
need ofemergency medical care to the hospital.
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4) The defendams were instrumental in bringing "DanceSafe," a group that
advocates harm reduction for users ofpsychoactive drugs, to distribute
literature to patrons.J106 p.8-9]
In a motion to dismiss, the defendants rebutted the governmem’s claims. Their
central purpose was to provide music.[106 p.7] The State Palace Theater had a zero-
tolerance policy that forbade possessing, selling or using drugs on the premises. This
policy was posted on signs throughout the venue and security guards refused admission
to anyone who appeared intoxicated.[106 p.7] The defendants arranged, via the New
Orleans Police Departmem, for many drug-related arrests ofpatrons found selling or
using drugs and even security guards found selling drugs.[106 p.7] The defendams also
invited the DEA into the theater and helped them dress as undercover "ravers" and as
security guards.[106 p.7] The defendants enforced their zero-tolerance policy. They
claimed that the DEA and the New Orleans Police Department repeatedly ignored their
notifications ofdrug activity discovered at the theater and on more than one occasion
detainees had to be released because no one came to arrest them.[106 p.7-8]
Furthermore, the defendants on multiple occasions requested the service ofa New
Orleans Police Department officer to assist in the prevention ofdrug use at the theater
and the requests were denied.[106 p.8]
The second case involved the same charge under the Crack House Statute, section
856(a)(2), to "knowingly and intemionally make available for use, said building for the
purpose ofunlawfully distributing and using comrolled substances...," as well as other
charges.[ 19] The case followed a DEA undercover operation at Club La Vela in Panama
City Beach, Florida.[19] The defendams in this case were Sea Watch ofPanama City
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Beach, Inc., d/b/a Club La Vela, and the managers ofthe club, Patrick Pfeffer and
Thorston Pfeffer. [ 19]
In order to appreciate the high profile of Club La Vela, the motion to dismiss reviews
the club’s history. The beachfront club first opened as La Vela Beach Club and Concert
Hall in 1984.[20 p.3] Over the years, the facility grew from a small beach club to an
enormous entertainment complex "described as the largest nightclub and event facility in
the United States with a capacity ofover 6,000 people."[20 p.3] The club is zoned as a
place ofpublic assembly.[20 p.4] It caters to performance artists and patrons who
participate in original and recorded music, dance, and light shows.[20 p.4-5] Club La
Vela is nationally known and has served as the headquarters for live and taped activities
such as the Spring Break Headquarters for the MTV cable network; has hosted national
events such as World Championship Wrestling, Bay Watch Talem Search, the Earthlink
Live Webcast of Spring Break 1999; and has hosted nationally and imernationally known
pop, rock, hip-hop and country music performances.[20 p.4] Many ofthese
performances have been broadcast and reported on the cable networks ofESPN,
MSNBC, TNT, MTV, E!TV and the Travel Channel.[20 p.4] As a result of its expansion
and popularity, Club La Vela’s operators modified procedures to deal with the large
volumes ofpeople using the facility, particularly those patrons who engage in the
consumption ofalcohol and controlled substances.[20 p.6] Club La Vela had a zero-
tolerance policy that forbade possession, sale and use ofdrugs on the premises; the policy
was posted throughout the venue and security staff enforced the policy.[20 p.6-7] The
defendants met with local law enforcemem officials and made changes to assist in
enforcemem ofthe zero-tolerance policy: they installed additional lighting, employed
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additional security, modified performance formats and initiated background checks on
employees, among other things.[20 p.7] As in the State Palace Theater case, the
government suggested that on-site emergency medical services as well as the sale ofglow
sticks, bottled water and other merchandise, at events involving thousands ofdancers, is
evidence ofcriminal activity.[20 p.9]
Both the State Palace Theater and Club La Vela cases have been criticized on several
grounds. First, it has been claimed that the Crack House Statute was not intended to be
used in an application such as these two cases.[20 p.12] Previous cases involving CHS
violations have involved literal crack houses or in the cases ofChen and Tamez, who as
owners ofbuildings with legitimate business purposes that secondarily served as places
of storage, sale or use ofcomrolled substances, were themselves directly involved in the
drug activity in some way.[106 p.20-21 ] The State Palace Theater and Club La Vela
cases differ from all other applications ofthe Crack House Statute in that the defendants
were not involved in drug activity but were alleged to have had knowledge ofdrug use by
others at their facilities. [20 p. 12; 106 p.20-21 ]
One serious criticism ofthis use ofthe Crack House Statute in these two cases is its
violation ofthe First Amendmem rights ofthe defendants. "The governmem’s
prosecution has both the effect and the purpose of shutting down concerts, ofeliminating
a form ofexpression which the governmem claims is associated with drug use."[106
p.21] This violation of First Amendmem rights is discussed in detail in the motions to
dismiss ofboth cases, citing numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases:
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1) In Ward v. RockAgainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), the Supreme Court
found "Music, as a form ofexpression and communication, is protected under
the First Amendment."[20 pl4; 106 p.21 ]
2) In Cinevision v. City ofBurbank, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985), a city’s attempt to
ban hard rock concerts because the concerts tended to attract narcotic users
was rejected as a violation ofconcert promoters First Amendment rights"
"All- political and non-political musical expression, like other forms of
entertainment, is a matter of first amendment concern A general fear that
state and local narcotic or other laws will be broken by people attending the
concerts cannot justif3, a content-based restriction on expression
Censorship cannot be used as a tool to prevent drug use; rather, law
enforcement officers can deal adequately and effectively with unlawful
activity.., at the time that it occurs. That is the proper exercise ofpolice
power, censorship is not."[20 p. 16; 106 p.21 ]
3) In Sable Communications ofCalifornia Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), the
Supreme Court found that in the comext ofthe First Amendment, any exercise
ofgovernmem regulation must be achieved in the least restrictive fashion, and
must be narrowly tailored to serve any legitimate government interest.
Prevention of illegal drug activity is a legitimate government interest but the
prosecution ofvenue managers and music promoters is not the least restrictive
way to accomplish this goal. Arresting drug dealers and purchasers is a far
more restrictive means to curtail drug use without infringing on the rights of
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others to engage in protected expression in the form ofmusic and dance.[20
p. 17; 106 p.22]
3) In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court found:
"the chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendmem rights may derive
from the fact ofthe prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or
failure."[20 p. 16; 106 p.21 ] It is likely that the prosecution ofthe State Palace
Theater and Club La Vela cases has had a chilling effect on other music venue
managers, electronic music promoters, other concert promoters and on the
operation of other places ofpublic assembly.
A second serious criticism ofthe State Palace Theater and Club La Vela cases, on
constitutional grounds, is based on the equal protection rights afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendmem (through the due process clause ofthe Fiith Amendmem). In Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Supreme Court found that "a prosecution must be
dismissed upon a showing that others similarly situated were not prosecuted and that the
selective prosecution was based on discrimination on the basis ofrace, religion, or the
exercise ofconstitutional rights."[20 p.22; 106 p.24] Rock concerts have long been
associated with various types ofdrug use, reggae and jazz concerts with marijuana use.
Yet no other venue manager has ever been indicted under the Crack House Statute for
providing a venue for music and dance where some patrons use drugs.
A third major criticism ofthese cases involves the Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth
Amendmem. In Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), the Supreme Court found
that membership in the Communist Party could not constitute a criminal offense:
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In our jurisprudence, guilt is personal, and when the imposition ofpunishmem on
a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship ofthat
status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity.., that relationship must
be sufficiemly substantial to satisfy the concept ofpersonal guilt in order to
withstand attack under the Due Process Clause ofthe FitCh Amendment.[20 p.24;
106 p.27]
Similarly, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Supreme
Court found that denying worker’s compensation benefits to illegitimate children violates
due process because it punishes children for the acts oftheir parems. "... legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."[20 p.24; 106
p.27] In the context ofthe State Palace Theater and Club La Vela cases, the defendants
are charged not because ofany drug activity on their part but because ofknowledge of
drug activity by others, despite their efforts to prevent the drug activity. Does this meet
the requiremem ofpersonal guilt?
Yet another criticism ofthese cases is on the grounds that the Crack House Statute is
vague and overly broad. Ifthe CHS can be applied to venues such as the State Palace
Theater and Club La Vela, then it could be applied to virtually every place ofpublic
assembly. Consider schools, parks, college dormitories, prisons, even personal
residences. These are all places where it is virtually impossible to prevem surreptitious
drug use. Furthermore, what constitutes a violation ofthis statute? If one person uses a
comrolled substance, is this a violation? In Grayned v. City ofRoclgCord, 408 U.S. 104
(1972), the Supreme Court found"
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It is a basic principle ofdue process that an enactmem is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly def’med. Vague laws offend several important values.
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person ofordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevemed, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
arbitrary basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Third... where a vague statute ’abuts upon sensitive areas ofbasic
First Amendmem freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise ofthose freedoms.’
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ’steer far wider ofthe unlawful
zone’ than ifthe boundaries ofthe forbidden areas were clearly marked.[20 p.26-
27; 106 p.28]
In the context ofmusic venues, the question becomes what must the owners, managers,
and concert promoters do to prevent illicit drug use on their premises and thereby be safe
from prosecution if surreptitious drug use occurs despite their efforts to prevem it?
Active enforcement ofa zero-tolerance drug policy, in full cooperation with law
enforcemem agencies, apparently is not enough. There is no "safe harbor" that allows
venue owners to know what they can do to avoid prosecution; no standard to know what
is legal and what is illegal.[9 p.5]
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The resolution ofthe State Palace Theater case was a plea bargain by two ofthe
defendams, the Brunet brothers. They pied guilty to a charge of conspiracy to violate
Title 21 ofthe United States Code, section 856(a)(2). They paid a $100,000 fine, were
given five year terms ofprobation and agreed not to sell or provide the following items at
the State Palace Theater: 1) Pacifiers, 2) Objects that glow, 3) Vapor rub products and
inhalers, 4) Masks ofany description, 5) Masseur, Masseuse or massage tables, 6) "Chill
Rooms."[107] Furthermore they agreed to take steps to prohibit patrons from bringing
items 1 -4 above imo the State Palace Theater.[ 107] The plea agreement assured the
Brunet brothers that they would not face potential 20 year prison terms and fines ofup to
a half million dollars each, or a f’me ofup to two million dollars for their corporation,
Barbecue ofNew Orleans, Inc.
After the conclusion ofthe State Palace Theater case there was a class action lawsuit
brought against the government, McClure v. Ashcroft, E.D. LA 01-2573 (2002), claiming
that the plea bargain, which prohibited the sale or presence of glowsticks at the State
Palace Theater, violated the first amendments rights ofthe plaintiffs, performance artists
who used glowsticks in their performance routines.[69] The judge in the case granted a
permanent injunction against enforcemem ofthe plea agreemem f’mding that "the
governmem cannot ban inherently legal objects.., because a few people use the same
legal item to enhance the effects ofan illegal substance"[69 p. 10] More importantly, the
judge further noted:
Although this court recognizes the perils ofdrug use, especially by young people,
and this Court recognizes that the intentions ofthe agents and prosecutors
involved were pure, when the First Amendmem right ofFree Speech is violated
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by the government in the name ofthe War on Drugs, and when that First
Amendmem violation is arguably not even helping in the War on Drugs, it is the
duty ofthe Courts to enjoin the government from violating the rights of innocent
people.[69 p.10-11]
This case was reversed on appeal, not on the merits ofthe First Amendment argumem
but on the technicality that a third party cannot challenge a plea agreement between two
other parties. [70]
The absurdity ofthe glowstick ban in the State Palace Theater plea agreement is
discussed in a 2001 Salon.com article, "Sell a Glowstick, Go to Prison." "The [ban]
seems to imply that if you take away the glowsticks, you take away the drugs. It’s
baffiingly backward logic, but then again, the federal governmem’s War on Drugs hasn’t
always made sense."[ 13]
The Club La Vela case were to trial. The governmem used arguments such as the
sale ofglow sticks and bottled water and provision ofemergency medical service as
evidence ofknowledge ofcriminal activity, similar to the State Palace theater case. After
two hours of deliberations the jurors returned a verdict of not guilty. [21 ]
The RAVE Act
After the failed prosecution ofthe Club La Vela case and the plea settlemem in the
State Palace Theater case, Senator Joseph Biden, a drug war legislator since the 1980s,
introduced a bill in the Senate on June 18, 2002 with the short title Reducing Americans’
Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of2002 or the RAVE Act.[87] In his introductory remarks
to the Senate, Biden cited the prosecutions in the Club La Vela and State Palace Theater
cases and noted the need to tailor the Crack House Statute "more precisely to the problem
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at hand," referring to raves.[5] Section 2 ofthe bill comained Findings 1- 10 that
specifically referred to raves, electronic music, club-drug use including Ecstasy and the
brain damage resulting from Ecstasy use (citing NIDA, a major source of funding for the
Ricaurte research group discussed earlier in this essay).[87] The tailoring that Biden
referred to would change the Crack House Statute as follows (see appendix, p.125-27):
1) In section (a)(1) ofthe CHS, the words "lease, rein, use" would be added to
"open or maintain."[87]
3) In section (a)(1) & (a)(2) ofthe CHS, the words "whether permanently or
temporarily" would be added in reference to the place used for illegal drug
activity.[87] This would allow application ofthe law to one-time evems such
as a dance party. Critics ofthis argue that the addition ofthe word
"temporarily" changes the initial intern ofthe Crack House Statute which
targeted property being used for on-going drug offenses and that the CHS was
not intended for isolated actions that may occur on a property. Business
owners could be prosecuted for isolated incidents, rather than patterns of
abuse.[9]
4) In Section (a)(2) ofthe CHS "building, room or enclosure" would be changed
to "any place."[87] Also, "occupant" would be added to the list of"owner,
lessee, agem, employee or mortgagee" and "profit from" added to the phrase
"rein, lease, or make available for use."[87] The purpose ofthe "any place"
change is to target dance parties held outdoors in open spaces such as a field,
or on the beach.
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5) The third major change to the CHS would be the addition ofa civil penalty,
Section 4 ofthe RAVE Act.[87] This would lower the burden ofproof from
"beyond a reasonable doubt" required for criminal guilt to "preponderance of
the evidence" for civil liability. It also allows a person to be punished with a
civil penalty without the right to a jury trial. Senator Biden’s imroductory
remarks to the Senate, as well as those ofthe co-sponsor, Senator Charles
Grassley, did not comain any mention ofthe addition ofthis civil penalty.[5;
431
6) The heading of section 856, would be changed from "Establishment of
manufacturing operations" to "Maintaining drug-involved premises."[87]
In the text ofthe RAVE Act, in the Findings section, note was made ofthe brain
damage due to MDMA/Ecstasy.[87] Senator Grassely’s introductory remarks also
referred to irreversible damage in the brain.[43] Prior congressional testimony by Asa
Hutchinson, given during his time as Administrator ofthe DEA, cited the Johns Hopkins
research group’s fmdings ofbrain damage from MDMA/Ecstasy.[51; 52](see p.24) The
misleading congressional testimony ofAlan Leshner, as Director ofthe National Institute
on Drug Abuse (NIDA), purportedly demonstrating brain images with evidence of
decreased cerebral blood flow, has already been discussed earlier in this essay. [64](see
p.28) The point is that the controversial research findings on MDMA/Ecstasy have been
used and even misrepresemed in congressional testimony in support ofthe RAVE Act.
The RAVE Act died in both the House and the Senate without a vote when the 107th
Congress adjourned at the end of2002.[87; 88] In January of2003, Senator Biden re-
introduced the Act.[53] The short title was changed to the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation
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Act of2003. The controversial "Findings" section that discussed raves, electronic music,
etc., was eliminated but the remainder ofthe bill was idemical to the original RAVE Act.
In a move that bypassed the traditional process of Congress, the new bill was attached as
an amendmem to an unrelated but popular bill that had versions already passed by both
the House and the Senate.[84] The PROTECT Act (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to End the Exploitation ofChildren Today Act of2003) is a child protection act
commonly known as the Amber Alert Act.[84] Title VI, section 608 ofthe PROTECT
Act is the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of2003.[84] The PROTECT Act was
signed into law by Presidem Bush on April 30, 2003.[84] The Illicit Drug Ant-
Proliferation Act, a.k.a, the RAVE Act, thus became law not by the democratic
committee process, not by a vote on its own merits, but as the result of a maneuver by a
few supporters who negotiated its attachmem to a popular child protection law.[63] This
latest legislation in the War on Drugs has not yet been applied; the first indictmem has
yet to be made under this law.
However, recall the from the State Palace Theater and Club La Vela cases that the
defendants cited Dombrowski, noting that the "chilling effect upon the exercise of First
Amendmem rights may derive from the fact ofthe prosecution, unaffected by the
prospects of its success or failure." [20 p. 16; 106 p.21 ](see p.73) On May 30, 2003, just
one month after the enactmem ofthe RAVE Act, a DEA agent emered a local Eagles
Lodge in Billings, Momana. The Lodge was the location for a meeting ofthe Momana
State University chapters ofthe National Organization for the Reform ofMarijuana Laws
and Students for a Sensible Drug Policy. The agem advised the facility manager that if
anyone used illegal drugs at the event the Lodge could be liable for a $250,000 fme under
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the civil penalty provision ofthe new RAVE Act. The evem was cancelled. "It was a
classic violation ofthe First Amendmem The government targeted an evem because
it disagreed with the political views of its organizers," said Harry Williams ofthe
ACLU.[1381
SECTION III: DRUG POLICY REFORM
Drug use is unarguably one of the most important issues facing contemporary
American society. It has implications in public health, criminal justice, civil rights and
national security. America’s drug policy has evolved over the past one hundred years. It
has been debated countless times in countless forums over ten decades. There are as
many opinions on the drug issue as there are people debating it. The spectrum of opinion
ranges from drug warrior prohibition to free market legalization. Despite the debate and
an ever-increasing body of evidence against continuation of our current policy, U.S. drug
policy remains a criminally sanctioned, prohibitionist policy and the escalation of the
War on Drugs continues. Enactment of the RAVE Act is the latest example of this. It is
a law of questionable constitutionality that has not yet been tested in the courts. It was
not a product ofthe democratic congressional process. It was not passed by a
congressional vote on its own merits but was attached to another popular act that was
sure to be passed by Congress. Recall that the Crack House Statute was expedited
through Congress and enacted during the sensationalized crack cocaine "epidemic" ofthe
1980s. (see p.50) In the MDMA/Ecstasy "panic" of recent years, the CHS statute was
modified into the RAVE Act and became law on the coattails of the Amber Alert Act.[63;
103 chap.6, sec.C.3,C4]
Drug policy reform is a difficult issue. It is politically unpopular to advocate a retreat
in the War on Drugs. A tough stand on drugs makes great rhetoric. It is much more
difficult to question the effectiveness ofthe War on Drugs, much less to challenge the
overall utility of a prohibitionist approach. Throughout the twentieth century, many
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individuals and groups have advocated against the War on Drugs, as will now be
discussed in the third section ofthis essay. Today, we are seeing more and more
opposition to continued advancement in this War, and more advocacy for a public health
and harm reduction model for managing this important problem in our society.
Criticism of Prohibition
Criticism ofprohibition is not new. Abraham Lincoln had this to say in a speech to
the Illinois House ofRepresematives in 1840:
Prohibition will work great injury to the cause oftemperance. It is a species of
intemperance within itself, for it goes beyond the bounds ofreason in that it
attempts to control a man’s appetite by legislation, and makes a crime out of
things that are not crimes. A prohibition law strikes a blow at the very principles
upon which our governmem was founded. Abraham Lincoln, 1840.[65]
Percy Andreae was a vocal opponent ofalcohol prohibition and he organized the
National Association ofCommerce and Labor, an organization for prohibition
resistance.[1 ] He made the following analogy between efforts to prohibit alcohol and a
literal interpretation ofa biblical passage:
Somewhere in the bible it is said: ’If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off’...
What? Merely cut offmy own right hand if it offends me? What business have
my neighbors to keep their right hands if I am not able to make mine behave
itself?. Offwith the lot ofthem! Let there be no right hands; then I am certain
that mine won’t land me in trouble. Percy Andreae, 1915.[ 1 ]
An editorial in the Illinois Joumal ofMedicine discussed the Harrison Narcotics Law
in 1926-
84
The Harrison Narcotics Law should never have been placed upon the statute
books ofthe United States. It is to be granted that the well-meaning blunderers
who put it there had in mind only the idea ofmaking it impossible for addicts to
secure their supply of"dope" and to prevem unprincipled people from making
their fortunes, and fattening upon the infirmities oftheir fellow men. As is the
case with most prohibitive laws, however, this one fell far short ofthe mark. So
far, in fact, that instead of stopping the traffic, those who deal in dope now make
double their money from the poor unfortunates upon whom they prey It is
costing the United States more.., than there is good coming from the farcical
laws now on the statute books As to the Harrison Narcotic Law, it is as with
prohibition [of alcohol] legislation. People are beginning to ask, ’Who did that
anyway?’ Illinois Journal ofMedicine, editorial, June 1926.[12 p.47]
August Volmer served as chief ofpolice in Berkely, California, professor ofpolice
administration at the Universities of Chicago and California, and president ofthe
International Association ofChiefs ofPolice and wrote a leading textbook on police
science.[ 12 p.47-48]
Stringent laws, spectacular police drives, vigorous prosecution, and imprisonmem
ofaddicts and peddlers have proved not only useless and enormously expensive
as means ofcorrecting this evil, but they are also unjustifiably and unbelievably
cruel in their application to the unfortunate drug victims. Repression has driven
this vice underground and produced the narcotic smugglers and supply agems,
who have grown wealthy out ofthis evil practice and who, by devious methods,
have stimulated traffic in drugs Drug addiction, like prostitution and like
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liquor, is not a police problem; it never has been and never can be solved by
policemen, but by scientific and competemly trained medical experts.- August
Volmer, 1936.[12 p.47-48]
Alfred Lindesmith was an Indiana University scholar and advocate of drug policy
reform in the 1930s through the 1960s.
Solemn discussions are carried on about lengthening the addict’s already long
sentence and as to whether or not he is a good parole risk. The basic question as
to why he should be sent to prison at all is scarcely mentioned. Eventually, it is to
be hoped that we shall come to see, as most ofthe civilized countries ofthe world
have seen, that the punishmem and imprisonment ofaddicts is as cruel and
pointless as similar treatment for persons infected with syphilis would be
The treatmem ofaddicts in the United States today is on no higher plane than the
persecution ofwitches of other ages, and like the latter it is to be hoped that it will
soon become merely another dark chapter ofhistory. Alfred R. Lindesmith,
1940.[12]
Rufus King was chairman ofthe American Bar Association’s committee on narcotics
in 1953. He organized and led the Joint Committee on Narcotic Drugs ofthe American
Bar Association and the American Medical Association that issued an unprecedented
critique ofthe prohibition paradigm. In 1973 he authored The Drug Hangup: America’s
Fifty-Year Folly.J62]
The true addict is totally enslaved to his habit. He will do anything to fend off
the illness, marked by physical and emotional agony that results from abstinence.
So long as society will not traffic with him on any terms, he must remain the
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abject servitor ofhis vicious nemesis, the peddler. The addict will commit crimes
mostly petty offenses like shoplifting and prostitution- to get the price the
peddler asks Drugs are a commodity oftrifling intrinsic value. All the
billions our society has spent enforcing criminal measures against the addict have
had the sole practical result ofprotecting the peddler’s market, artificially
inflating his prices, and keeping his profits famastically high. No other nation
hounds its addicts as we do, and no other nation faces anything remotely
resembling our problem.- Rufus King, 1953.[12 p.48-49]
Dr. Karl Bowman was one ofthis country’s most prominent psychiatrists and an
authority on narcotics.[12 p.49]
For the past 40 years we have been trying the mainly punitive approach; we have
increased penalties, we have hounded the drug addict, and we have brought out
the idea that any person who takes drugs is a most dangerous criminal and a
menace to society. We have perpetuated the myth that addiction to opiates is the
great cause ofcrimes of violence and of sex crimes. In spite ofthe statemems of
the most eminem medical authorities in this country and elsewhere, this type of
propaganda still continues, coming to a large extent from the enforcement bureaus
of federal and state governments. Our whole dealing with the problem ofdrug
addiction for the past 40 years has been a sorry mess." Dr. Karl Bowman,
1957.[12 p.49]
Dr. Jerome Jaffe is a psychiatrist who promoted methadone treatment for heroin
addicts in the 1960s. In 1971 President Nixon appointed him Director ofthe Special
Action Office ofDrug Abuse Prevemion. He also served as head ofNIDA’s Addiction
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Research Center. He is currently professor ofpsychiatry at the University ofMaryland
and the Johns Hopkins University School ofHygiene and Public Health.[57]
Much ofthe ill health, crime, degeneracy, and low standard of living are the
result not of drug effects, but ofthe social structure that makes it a criminal act to
obtain or to use opiates for their subjective effects It seems reasonable to
wonder ifproviding addicts with a legitimate source ofdrugs might not be
worthwhile, even if it did not make them our most productive citizens and did not
completely eliminate the illicit market but resulted merely in a marked reduction
in crime, disease, social degradation, and human misery. Dr. Jerome Jaffe, 1965.
[12]
The 1972 Consumers Union Report on Licit and Illicit Drugs states:
There is little likelihood that further tinkering with the laws.., will prove more
successful than the hundreds of such laws already on the books. Legislators who
trust in such measures are failing to face the facts. Narcotic addiction remains
endemic despite the most ingenious laws and vigorous law enforcement. The
time has come to end our dependence on repressive legislation and law
enforcement as a cure for the narcotics evil, and to explore more rational
altematives. The history ofthe narcotics laws and ofalcohol prohibition...
should warn us against going further down a similar legislative blind alley with
respect to marijuana, LSD, the amphetamines, the barbiturates, and other drugs of
current concern. Consumers Union Report on Licit and Illicit Drugs, 1972.
[12 p.57]
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Recommendations of the 1972 Consumers Union Report
The last quote above was taken from a comprehensive report that looked at the
history ofU.S. drug policy and specifically at concems with individual drugs including
opiates, caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, barbiturates, cocaine, inhalants, LSD, marijuana, and
amphetamines. The 1972 report concluded with a list of six recommendations aimed to
rectify fifty-seven years, from 1914, the year the Harrison Narcotic Act was passed, until
1971 when the report was completed, of"mistaken laws and policies, of mistaken
attitudes toward drugs, and of futile, however well intentioned, efforts to stamp out the
drug menace."[12 p.418] The Consumers Union Report focused largely, not on the drug
problem, but on the "drug problem problem- the damage that results from the ways in
which society has approached the drug problem."[12 p.418] The six recommendations of
the 1972 Consumers Union Report were:[12 p.418-23]
(1) Stop emphasizing measures designed to keep drugs away from people.
(2) Stop publicizing the horrors ofthe "drug menace."
(3) Stop increasing the damage done by drugs.
(4) Stop misclassifying drugs.
(5) Stop viewing the drug problem as primarily a national problem.
(6) Stop pursuing the goal of stamping out illicit drug use.
In reading these recommendations today, in 2004, one realizes that for the most part
they are still valid. They appear to be what must be done to gain comrol ofthe drug issue
in our society. None ofthe recommendations have been implemented. In fact, it appears
that the opposite ofthese recommendations have continued as the basis for U.S. drug
policy over the past 32 years, from 1972 to 2004. It was right around the time ofthe
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Consumers Union Report that Presidem Nixon officially declared the War On Drugs,
taking America farther down the road ofprohibition, precisely what the Consumers
Union Report advised against. It is useful to look at the recommendations ofthe
Consumers Union Report from a current perspective, with the experiences of 1972 to
2004 behind us.
#1" Stop Emphasizing Measures Designed to Keep Drugs Away From People
Prohibition has been the cornerstone ofU.S. drug policy since the Harrison Narcotic
Act was passed in 1914. In 1920 the "Noble Experiment" started when alcohol
prohibition became the law ofthe land.[83] The Eighteemh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States."[39] The United States learned between 1920 and 1933 that alcohol prohibition
did not work. In 1933 the Twenty First Amendment to the Constitution repealed alcohol
prohibition.[122]
There are some valuable lessons to be learned from the Noble Experiment. Alcohol
prohibition was supported by many factors and theoretically it is understandable why it
could be a desirable public health policy:
1) Statistically, alcohol is linked with other public health concerns:
a) Alcohol addiction is widespread. In 1920 alcohol addiction was
second only to nicotine addiction in incidence and prevalence in the
United States.[12 p.216] This remains true today.
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b) Alcohol consumption is intrinsically linked with violem crime.
Alcohol plays a significant role in homicide, child abuse, domestic
violence, and suicide. [ 12 p.217]
c) Alcohol is implicated in high percemages of fatal and non-fatal motor
vehicle accidems as well as other forms ofaccidems.[33]
2) Physical harm from alcohol is a major cause of morbidity and mortality in the
United States. Alcohol’s harmful effects include central nervous system
damage, liver damage, gastrointestinal damage, and heart damage, to memion
a few ofthe acute and chronic life-threatening effects of excessive alcohol
consumption.J12 p.216-17]
3) Alcohol is a drug ofchoice for the vulnerable youth that drug policy should
protect.
4) The popular temperance movement in the United States in the early twentieth
cemury supported the moral aspect ofprohibition. From this point ofview
alcohol use was wrong, its use was a matter ofchoice and weakness ofthe
will led to addiction.
However, in 1933 the Twenty First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ended the
Noble Experimem.[83] The reason was alcoholprohibition didn’t work. People still
drank drying prohibition. All ofthe above adverse effects ofalcohol on individuals and
society cominued. In addition, new and unamicipated problems emerged: increased
potency ofthe prohibited substance, black markets and organized crime are some
examples.
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During the 1920s, after enactment ofthe Eighteemh Amendmem, the "Iron Law of
Prohibition" took effect. This principle asserts that the more intense the law
enforcement, the more potent the prohibited substance becomes, and the prohibited
substance will become adulterated with unknown and dangerous substances.[118 p. 1-2]
The basis ofthis principle is that the developmem of a black market leads to potem, more
concemrated forms ofprohibited substances because ofthe realities of marketing,
profitability and risk.[118 p.2] A case ofwhisky can be smuggled with the same risk as a
case ofbeer yet bring higher profit.[26] The same effect was seen again decades later in
the developmem ofthe potem form ofbase cocaine, crack cocaine.[26; 118] It is easier
to conceal and transport small pieces ofcrack than bulky powder cocaine, which is in
turn less bulky than the coca leaves used by drug consumers in South America.[26] This
principle explains why drug users in drug-producing coumries consume drugs in their
natural form while in coumries where drugs are prohibited consumption ofdrugs is in
their most potent, refined forms.[26] Bootleg alcohol was not only more potent but was
often adulterated and contaminated and this increased the morbidity and mortality
associated with alcohol consumption. An example is the use ofmethyl alcohol, in place
ofthe prohibited ethyl alcohol, which led to blindness and death.[12 p.221] We see this
same problem today with adulteration of heroin, cocaine, MDMA/Ecstasy and other
prohibited drugs.
The income potential from the marketing ofa prohibited product leads to the
developmem ofthe black market, which in turn leads to the developmem oforganized
crime.[115] The black market for alcohol led to the expansion oforganized crime in the
U.S. in the 1920s.[12 p.221] When goods are prohibited and markets are illegal, the usual
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methods oftransacting business such as marketing, advertising and settling disputes must
be conducted underground.[73 chap.4] The usual and legal means available to legitimate
businesses such as regulations, unions, lawyers, and the courts are all unavailable to black
market businesses.[73 chap.4] The result is coercion and violence in the defense of
territories, collection ofunpaid debt, elimination ofcompetitors and settlement of
disputes. [73 chap.4]
Jeffery Miron asserts in his recently published book, Drug War Crimes, that the
theory of crime and violence associated with the black markets created by prohibition is
incomplete.[73 p.44] The real driving force behind the crime is not simply the
prohibition but the level ofenforcement ofthe prohibition; the amount ofcrime and
violence increases with the degree ofenforcement.[73 p.44] As America escalates its
War on Drugs, "reliance on prohibition, on laws and law enforcement, lulls the country
decade aiter decade into a false confidence that nothing more need be done except to
pass yet another law, or hire a few hundred more narcotic agents..."[12 p.418-19] The
irony ofthis situation is that, according to Miron’s theory, we are increasing crime and
violence as we escalate the War on Drugs.
In "Alcohol Prohibition Was A Failure," Mark Thorton presems some data on federal
convicts, federal expenditures on prisons, and homicide data during alcohol
prohibition.[ 118] Immediately before 1914, prior to the Harrison Narcotics Act and
alcohol prohibition, there were 4,000 federal convicts, about 75% ofwhom were in
federal prisons.[118 p.4] By 1932 the number of federal convicts had increased to
25,589, represeming an increase ofover 550%.[118 p.4] The federal prison population
grew over 360%.[118 p.4] Federal expenditures on prisons increased more that 1000%
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between 1915 and 1932 and despite this the prisons were severely over crowded.[118
p.5] The increase in crime was a combination of alcohol and drug prohibition violations
as well as an increase in other crimes, including violent crimes, stemming from the
underground market.[118 p.5] The homicide rate increased from six per one hundred
thousand to ten per one hundred thousand during this period.[118 p.5] The rising
homicide rate was reversed aiter the repeal ofalcohol prohibition in 1933 and the rate
declined through he 1930’s and 1940’s.[118 p.5]
Miron presems homicide data in a more detailed analysis in Drug War Crimes.[73
chap.4] He looks at homicide rates in the United States for the period 1900 1995. His
figures for the period 1914 1932 are consistem with the figures quoted by Thorton
above.[73 p.47] Miron documents that the homicide rate showed a general decline from
1933 until the early 1960s.[73 p.47] In the mid-1960s the homicide rate began to rise
until the mid 1970s where it reached a level slightly above the previous peak in 1933,
then it fluctuated around this relatively high level through the end ofthe sample period in
1995.[73 p.47] Miron points out that homicide rates show two peaks during the twemieth
century, the 1920- 1933 period and the 1970- 1995 period.[73 p.47] Miron goes a step
further and looks at federal expenditures for the enforcemem ofalcohol and drug
prohibition during the same period, 1900- 1995.[73 p.49] There are two impressive
spikes, one between 1920- 1933 and one between 1970- 1995.[73 p.49] Miron
discusses the two possibilities for these spikes" increased homicide rates leads to
increased enforcemem or increased enforcemem leads to increased homicide rates.[73
p.50] Based on his extensive research, he favors the latter relationship. He concludes:
"the estimated impact of enforcement on homicide is not only positive but large; it
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suggests that eliminating drug prohibition would reduce homicide in the United States by
25 75%."[73 p.51]
Considering the numerous adverse physical and social harms ofalcohol, it was
believed much would be gained by making alcohol unavailable. Alcohol prohibition was
imended to cure society ofmany ills. At the beginning ofprohibition the Reverend Billy
Sunday predicted: "The reign ofterror is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We
will tum our prisons into factories and our jails imo storehouses and corncribs. Men will
walk upright now, women will smile and children will laugh. Hell will be forever for
rein."[118 p.4] Yet after a thirteen year experiment, the United States rejected alcohol
prohibition. America realized "prohibition does not in fact prohibit and that it brings in
its wake additional adverse effects."[ 12 p.221] The law of supply and demand is not one
ofthe laws that the U.S. Congress enacted and it is not one that it could repeal.[120]
America is now learning that prohibition is not the answer to the drug problem either.
#2: Stop Publicizing the Horrors of the "Drug Menace"
Scare tactics have always been part ofAmerica’s approach to drug use. A
comemporary example is the 1990s television advertisement showing an egg being fried
with the commem "This is your brain on drugs." Another example is NIDA’s ami-
Ecstasy campaign that showed brain images with holes in them depicting the effects of
MDMA/Ecstasy use. These images were not only scare tactics but misrepresented the
facts as discussed in the first section ofthis essay. (see p.27)
Anti-drug publicity may have the effect ofpopularizing drugs. This was a factor in
the popularization ofglue sniff’mg in the 1960s, as described in the Consumers Union
Report, Chapter 44, "How to Launch a Nationwide Drug Menace".[12 p.261-271]
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Publicity may well have comributed to the rapid and widespread use ofEcstasy in the
1980s following all the media coverage surrounding the DEA scheduling controversy.
#3: Stop Increasing the Damage Done by Drugs
This recommendation encompasses a number of issues, both the literal (chemical)
damage done by drugs as well as the collateral damage resulting from the War on Drugs.
Prohibition and the black market for drugs increase the chemical damage done by drugs
in several ways. The "Iron Law ofProhibition," discussed above, leads to increased
potency ofthe prohibited drug. This was seen with alcohol in the 1920s and with the
development ofcrack cocaine in the 1980s. There are also the problems ofunknown
dosage and adulteration. Today we see the adulteration ofMDMA/Ecstasy with various
other drugs such as dextromethorphan, ketamine, various amphetamine analogs, PCP and
LSD, to name a few.[50 p.163]
Collateral damage from drug prohibition is extensive. Consider the social and
f’mancial damage resulting from drug use in our society: "Loss ofemploymem, expulsion
from school, exclusion from respectable society similarly serve to increase the damage
done by drugs- and over all ofthe other penalties hovers society’s ultimate sanction,
imprisonment..."[12 p.421 ] Incarceration is one ofthe most damaging consequences of
drug use; damaging to drug users, to their families and to society.
The U.S. Prison Population
The United States has the largest prison population in the world, totaling 2.1 million
people at year-end 2002.[35] 2002 was the first year this figure exceeded the 2 million
mark.[41 ] The second largest prison population is in China, with 1.51 million
incarcerated people in 2003.[35] There are over 9 million incarcerated people
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worldwide.[35] The 2.1 million prisoners in the United States represem over 23% ofthe
world’s prison population. The United States also has the highest incarceration rate in
the world. At mid-year 2003 the U.S. rate of incarceration, including federal and state
prisons, and local jails, was 715 inmates per 100,000 residems.[99] The second highest
rate was Russia with 584 inmates per 100,000 residems.[99] Sixty percent of all
coumries have rates below 150 per 100,000.[99] The United Kingdom has 143 inmates
per 100,000 residems and this rate represents the highest rate in the European Union.[99]
Since enactment ofmandatory minimum semences in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
the budget for the Federal Bureau ofPrisons has increased 1,954%, from $220 million in
1986 to $4.3 billion in 2001 .[35 p.5] Yet even these increases have not met the demand
for prison beds created by the War on Drugs. At year-end 2002 the federal prison system
was operating at 33% above capacity.[35 p.5]
The War on Drugs is the one factor that has had the greatest impact on the growth of
the U.S. prison system since the mid-1980s.[86 sec.V] It is estimated that over 400,000
incarcerated people are drug offenders, representing close to 20% ofthe total U.S. prison
population.[86 sec.V; 120 p.1] The reasons for the increased incarceration ofdrugs
offenders are increased arrest rates, increased incarceration rates and increased length of
semences.[86 sec.V] Between 1980 and 1997 the rate of incarceration of adult drug
offenders increased from 15 per 100,000 to 148 per 100,000, represeming a ten-fold
increase.[86 sec.V] Between 1987 and 1996, federal drug semences doubled.[86 sec.V]
Between 1980 and 1998 the number ofdrug offenders in state prisoners increased from
6% to 21%; for federal prisons the number ofdrug offenders increased from 25% in 1980
to 59% in 2000.[86 sec.V] The currem number ofadmissions to state and federal prisons
97
for drug offenses is about 100,000 per year.[86 sec.V] The burgeoning U.S. prison
population has been referred to as a "drug gulag" by former U.S. Drug Czar Barry
McCaffrey.[86 sec.V]
Racism and U.S. Drug Policy
One aspect ofthe War on Drugs in general, and criminal sanctions for drug offenders
in particular, that has moved to the forefront in the drug debate is the issue ofracism.
U.S. drug policy has allegedly been motivated by racism since its origins in the early
twemieth century. David Musto discusses this in The American Disease: Origins of
Narcotic Control:
If cocaine was a spur to violence against whites in the South, as was generally
believed by whites, this reaction against its users made sense. The fear ofthe
cocainized black coincided with the peak of lynchings, legal segregation and
voting laws all designed to remove political and social power from him. Fear of
cocaine might have comributed to the dread that the black would rise above ’his
place,’ as well as reflecting the extem to which cocaine may have released
defiance and retribution. So far, evidence does not suggest that cocaine caused a
crime wave but rather that anticipation of black rebellion inspired white alarm.
Anecdotes [were] often told ofsuperhuman strength, cunning and efficiency
resulting from cocaine Another myth, that cocaine made blacks almost
unaffected by mere .32 caliber bullets, is said to have caused southem police
departmems to switch to .38 caliber revolvers. These fantasies characterized
white fear, not the reality of cocaine’s effects, and gave one more reason for the
repression ofblacks.[75 p.7]
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The New York Times published a story in 1914 that claimed, "most attacks upon
white women ofthe South are the direct result ofthe ’cocaine-crazed’ Negro brain" and
that "Negro cocaine fiends are now a known southern menace."[49] These stories were
used for political purpose to gain support of southern members of Congress for the
Harrison Narcotic Act.[49] When marijuana become popular in the 1920s and 1930s in
American jazz clubs, racist anti-marijuana propaganda was used as evidence ofthe
"crumbling ofracial barriers" because whites and blacks smoked it together in the
clubs.[49]
African-Americans were not the only targets of fear-induced drug legislation. In the
late 1800s and early 1900s increased immigration of Chinese into the western United
States led to fears ofcompetitive and cheap Chinese labor.[18] Strong anti-Chinese
semimem grew. It was further fueled by vivid stories ofwhite women being "seduced
into a life ofprostitution and debauchery in opium dens." [49] In 1882 the Chinese
Exclusion Act was passed by the U.S. Congress.[ 18] It banned Chinese from
immigrating into the United States and remained in effect umil 1943 when China became
an important ally ofthe United States against Japan.[ 18] This Act was repealed for
political reasons rather than for human rights reasons.[ 18]
Similarly, during the Great Depression, racism was used to pass the 1937 Marijuana
Tax Act. This law made marijuana use in the United States illegal. It was passed in
response to marijuana use by Mexican immigrants in the southwestern United
States.[ 137] The same Mexicans that were competing with unemployed Americans for
jobs were "engaged in marijuana induced violence against Americans."[49] In
Congressional testimony on The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 by Harry Anslinger, head of
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the Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, the reason for outlawing marijuana was given as its
"violem effect on the degenerate races."[97 Section 1.] Eric Sterling refers to this racist
aspect ofU.S. drug policy in "Drug Laws and Thought Crime": "When you look at the
history ofthe drug laws themselves, they are the seeds ofrace hatred planted in the
law."[110 p.327]
Musto summarized this aspect of early U.S drug policy: "They [drugs] were widely
seen as substances associated with foreigners or alien subgroups. Cocaine raised the
specter ofthe wild Negro, opium the devious Chinese, morphine the tramps in the slums;
it was feared that use of all these drugs was spreading imo the ’higher classes’."[75
p.657] These stories all reinforced racial stereotypes and compounded the drug problem
by adding racism to all the other aspects ofthe issue. "American concern with narcotics
is more than a medical or legal problem- it is in the fullest sense a political problem.
The energy that has given impetus to drug control and prohibition came from profound
tensions among races, ethnic minorities, and generations- as well as from the actual
effects of certain drugs."[75 p.244]
Over the past thirty years, as America’s War on Drugs has escalated, we have seen
the emergence ofanother racist aspect ofU.S. drug policy. We have seen the
disproportionate application ofdrug laws in minority populations. The marked racial
disparity in drug arrests and convictions do not represem racial differences in drug law
violations.[86 Sec.I] Most drug offenders are white; there are five times as many white
drug users as black drug users.[86 Sec.I] These proportions, however, are not reflected in
who is arrested, convicted and incarcerated.
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A major factor in this disproportionate application ofdrug laws is the crack cocaine
phenomenon ofthe 1980s. As discussed above, crack cocaine was the focus of social and
political concern in the 1980s. The enactment ofthe 100-to- 1, powder-to-crack ratio and
mandatory minimum sentences were both part ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986.[2](see p.53, 55) Human Rights Watch discusses this issue in its 2000 report,
"Punishmem and Prejudice" Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs":
Although crack was the least used of all illicit drugs in the U.S., and although
more whites use illicit drugs than blacks, the "war on drugs" has been targeted
most notoriously at the possession and sale ofcrack cocaine by blacks. Crack
cocaine in black neighborhoods became a lightning rod for a complicated and
deep-rooted set ofracial, class, political, social, and moral dynamics. To the
extent that the white majority in the U.S. idemified both crime and drugs with the
"dangerous classes" i.e., poor urban blacks it was easier to endorse, or at least
acquiesce in, punitive penal policies that might have been rejected ifmembers of
their own families and communities were being sere to prison at comparable
rates. [86 sec.VII]
The United States Semencing Commission reported in 1997 that "nearly 90 percent of
the offenders convicted in federal court for crack cocaine distribution are African-
American while the majority ofcrack cocaine users are white."[102 p.8] A similar
figure, 85%, was stated in the Commission’s 2002 report. [90 Executive Summary] This
figure does not reflect a higher percentage ofblacks as users ofcrack cocaine.
Approximately two-thirds ofcrack users are white or Hispanic, yet the vast majority of
persons convicted ofpossession ofcrack cocaine in federal courts are African-
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American.[27 p.2] In 1995, the Commission reported to Congress that their research
revealed because of lower state penalties for crack cocaine, the decision to prosecute in
federal versus state court makes a dramatic difference in semences.[103 chap.8,
sec.B.2.e.] Federal prosecutorial power is discretionary; the Justice Department can
choose which cases go to federal court.[109] They should be the high-level offenders but
they are not.[109] Beyond this federal prosecutorial discretion, the jurisdictional
discretion of law enforcement officers is part ofthis issue. The end result is that the cases
going to the federal courts and thus being subjected to the "exaggerated ratio" are racial
minorities.[103 chap.8, sec.B.2.c.] "Thus, semences appear to be harsher and more
severe for racial minorities as a result ofthis law..."[103 chap.8, sec. B.2.c.]
There are several other factors that contribute to the disproportionate application of
drug laws in minority populations. The "major fronts" in the War on Drugs have been
concemrated in urban, low-income (i.e. minority) neighborhoods and in these
neighborhoods drug transactions tend to take place in public places.[86 sec.VII]
Transactions occur more frequemly in low-income neighborhoods because users buy
smaller quamities, more frequemly.[27] Both ofthese factors make it easier for law
enforcement officers to make arrests. Tactical considerations encourage concentrating
anti-drug efforts in these neighborhoods; police measure effectiveness by the number of
arrests and it is easier to make arrests in these neighborhoods.[86 sec.VII] In white
neighborhoods, working class through the upper class, drug transactions are more likely
to take place indoors, in homes, clubs and bars, and thereby drug arrests are more
difficult, take longer and cost more.[86 sec.VII] Racial profiling, the police practice of
stopping, questioning and searching potential criminal suspects in vehicles or on the
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street, based solely on racial appearance, leads to more minority drug arrests as well.[86,
sec.VII; 114 p.4-5]
However, the well-established fact that federal crack cocaine defendants are
overwhelmingly minorities stems also from practices higher up in the federal
government. Key to understanding this fact is the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, its
creation ofthe 100-to-1, powder-to-crack ratio and mandatory minimum sentences, but
most importantly congressional intent surrounding enactment ofthis law. "The Federal
governmem’s most intense focus ought to be on major traffickers.., the heads of
organizations who are responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities of
drugs."[112 citing House Report 99-845, Sept. 19, 1986] Yet, the United States
Sentencing Commission reported to Congress in 1995 that only 5.5% of federal crack
defendams and 9.2% of federal powder cocaine defendams were high-level dealers.[112]
Eric Sterling was personally involved in the 1986 legislation as Presidem Reagan’s
counsel to the House Committee on the Judiciary.[ 108] He commems on this f’mding in
"Racially Disproportionate Outcomes in Processing Drug Cases":
Every Federal prosecution is the result of investigative and prosecutorial decisions
by assistant U.S. attomeys, and DEA special agents, but they are frequently
initiated by informams. The thousands ofdecisions to arrest and prosecute these
low-level defendants instead of higher-level traffickers reflect the de facto
policies and practices ofthe U.S. Departmem ofJustice. The triggering quamities
ofthe 1986 mandatory minimum statute were set improperly, but at every level of
case review, officials ofthe U.S. Department ofJustice have known that they are
not prosecuting high-level traffickers as directed by Congress or in conformity
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with the National Drug Control Strategy. Continuously, for more that a decade
since Members ofCongress complained to the Attorney General about this
discriminatory outcome, the Justice Department has prosecuted cocaine
traffickers who are predominantly low-level and are overwhelmingly black or
Hispanic.
Cumulatively, these Justice Department decisions constitute a pattern or practice
of racial discrimination in the choice oftargets a pattern or practice that has
been tolerated by the top management ofthe DEA and the U.S. Department of
Justice, including the Attorney General, and ultimately the Presidem. [112]
Sterling argues that focusing on the 100-to-1 ratio and mandatory minimums alone
"misses the big picture":
The key is that federal prosecutorial power is discretionary. The Justice
Department picks which cases go to federal court. They should be the most
important ones but they aren’t. The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 1995 report
revealed that.., only 5% [of federal crack defendants in 1994] were high-level
offenders. Federal power is being wasted on the small fry. Ifthe Feds were
focusing on high-level dealers, the racial disparity in cocaine sentencing would
disappear. Federal anti-cocaine efforts should be focused on those who ship
cocaine by the ton, in 1 million-gram loads, not the 5-gram, 50-gram street
criminals. Ifthere is any force on the globe that can successfully challenge the
cocaine dealers’ billions of dollars in revenues and private armies, it’s U.S. law
enforcement but not ifthe officials are running down hoodlums at the comer
crack house. These low-level, non-white defendants are the least important drug
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trafficking offenders even though they are getting longer semences than high-
level drug traffickers Isn’t this evidence of a "pattern or practice" ofracial
discrimination? That is why the Congressional Black Caucus is outraged
Arguing about sentences for 5-gram, 25-gran 50-gram or 100-gram cases when
cocaine floods in million-gram and multimillion-gram shipmems, is a debate
about the size ofthe minnows. We must stop letting the Justice Department, the
attorney general and the "drug-czar" offthe hook as the big fish get away.[109]
Consider Sterling’s commems about the federal focus on the small fry while the big fish
get away in the comext ofthe MDMMEcstasy issue. The multibillion dollar world
MDMA/Ecstasy market is believed to be controlled by Israeli and Russian drug
syndicates who comrol production in Western-Europe, predominantly the Netherlands
and Belgium.[29; 44] Would shutting down The State Palace Theater, Club La Vela or
any other music venue and incarcerating the managers and the music promoters have a
major impact on MDMA/Ecstasy problem in the United States?
The media’s portrayal ofthe MDMA/Ecstasy issue also reveals a racial aspect to this
currem U.S. drug problem. Philip Jenkins elaborates on this is his congressional
testimony on club drugs.[58] The media coverage ofMDMA/Ecstasy refers to the
problem in terms such as "a hot new high hits Main Street," "the latest drug invading the
heartland" and the "suburban drug scene."[58 p.6] Jenkins states, "the racial codes are
transparent."[58 p.6] He points out that the fear ofwhite America is that "inner-city
conditions- namely the problems afflicting minorities could be visited upon ’nice kids’
in the suburbs."[58 p.6] "Throughout media coverage, we hear repeatedly that those
most at risk from the new drug culture are young and white."[58 p.6]
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Consider some statistics: According to the U.S. Census, blacks represent
approximately 12.5% ofthe U.S. population, Hispanics 12% and whites 69%.[36 p.1]
Based on the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (conducted by the Substance
Abuse and Memal Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) ofthe Departmem of
Health and Human Services) that there are five times as many whites who use drugs, as
there are blacks who use drugs.[36 p.2] However, blacks represem 30% ofdrug arrests,
41% ofpersons in local jails on drug charges (awaiting trial on drug charges or with
semences less than one year on drug charges), and 49% ofpersons in state and federal
prisons on drug charges.[86 sec.III] Nationwide, one in twenty, or 5%, ofadult black
males are incarcerated.[86 sec.III, table 6] One in three, or 33%, ofblack males aged 20
-29 are under correctional supervision (incarcerated, paroled or on probation).[86 sec.III]
Nationwide, adult black males are incarcerated at a rate 9.6 times the rate for adult white
males.[86 sec.III, table 5] In Connecticut, the rate is 20 times.[86 sec.III, table 5] In the
District of Columbia, the rate is 49 times.[86 sec.III, table 5] Look at incarceration rates
a differem way, as the number ofpeople incarcerated per 100,000 residems. In Arizona,
the state with the highest number of incarcerations for adult white males, 1,151 people
per 100,000 residents, the number is lower than the state with the lowest figure for adult
black males, which is Vermont with 1,195 people per 100,000 residents.[86 sec.III, table
5] In other words, the worst rate for whites (Arizona) is better than the best rate for
blacks (Vermont).
Graham Boyd, Director ofthe American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Drug Policy
Litigation Project, compares this phenomenon with slavery and the Jim Crow laws in his
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article "Collateral Damage In The War On Drugs."[8] Section IV, "The Birth ofa New
Slave Nation," discusses the comparison:
Slaves were bound on plamations from which they could not escape. Now, it is
prisons that deprive African descendants oftheir freedom. For African-American
men between the ages oftwenty and twenty-nine, almost one in three are
curremly under the thumb ofthe criminal justice system. The number ofblack
men deprived of freedom is now approaching numbers seen only in the worst
days of slavery.
The right to vote did not exist for slaves Today, 1.5 million black men, out of
10.4 million who would otherwise be eligible, cannot vote because ofcriminal
convictions. In many states, like Florida and Alabama, close to one-third of black
men have lost the right to vote forever. [Convicted drug offenders are denied the
right to vote in states throughout the country. Forty-six states and the District of
Columbia deny the vote to all convicted adults in prison, thirty-two states deny
the vote to those on parole, twenty-nine states deny it to those on probation,
fourteen states prevent ex-offenders who have fully served their sentences from
voting and ten ofthose states deny the vote to ex-felons for life.[4]]
Slaves were kept purposefully illiterate and uneducated Frederick Douglass’
description of his master’s prohibition ofhis education reverberates with currem
drug policies" ’Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world. Now, said [the
master], ifyou teach that nigger how to read, there would be no keeping him. It
would forever unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become unmanageable,
and ofno value to his master.’
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Under the War on Drugs, Congress has once again moved to close the gates of
education to many African-Americans and other minorities. Under the Higher
Education Act (HEA) of 1998, federal financial aid, including loans, grants and
work-study, is denied to any student convicted of a drug related offense. Given
that 55% ofthose convicted ofdrug offenses are black, and the fact that this law
will not affect the wealthy who do not need financial aid, the HEA plainly targets
low-income people of color. Murder and rape do not render a person ineligible;
however, being convicted ofpossessing small quantities of marijuana is enough to
lose fmancial aid and the opportunity to better oneself through a college
education. [8 see.IV]
Boyd’s comparisons also include: the higher rates ofdrug testing pregnam minority
women vs. pregnam white women and resultant loss ofcustody oftheir children similar
to the separation of mothers and children in slavery; the fact that the disproportionately
high rate ofAIDS in minority women is exacerbated due to the American drug policy ban
on clean needles and needle exchange which he likens to the poor health care available to
slaves. [8 see.IV]
Ira Glasser, Executive Director ofthe ACLU, refers to this racist aspect ofU.S. drug
policy in his address at the 1999 ACLU Biennial Conference, "... it is no longer possible
in this country to talk about race discrimination without talking about drug policy, and it
is no longer possible to talk about drug policy without talking about race. And we must,
in talking about both, confrom the issue ofepidemic incarceration."[42 p.8]
Human Rights Watch has reported that the disproportionate incarceration ofAfrican-
Americans, largely due to drug prosecutions, violates international human rights
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treaties.[86 p.2] The Imemational Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial
Discrimination does not define discrimination as intentional conduct but as conduct that
has the "purpose or effect" ofrestricting rights on the basis ofrace.[86 p.2]
Boyd concludes his article, "Collateral Damage In The War On Drugs":
Here lies the new Civil Rights Movement. As in a recurring nightmare, it revisits
the same issues civil rights activists faced in the 1960s when fighting Jim Crow
and the same issues abolitionists faced in the 19th century. The weakening of
American democracy and the emergence ofyet another institutionalized system
that condones discrimination reflects our legacy ofracism We chronically
disavow the sin, distancing ourselves from the old, discredited form ofracism.
We denounce it. We say we have f’mally healed ourselves. Yet,... it rises back
up to the surface and today takes form as the War on Drugs. We must recognize
it and call it by its true name. It is American apartheid, the new Jim Crow.[8]
Activist Reverend A1 Sharpton has referred to this issue as the reincarnation ofJim Crow
as "James Crow, Esquire."[110 p.335-36] This racist aspect ofthe U.S. War on Drugs is
an example ofa profound collateral consequence ofU.S. drug policy and an appalling
example ofhow drug policy increases the damage done by drugs.
Returning to the Consumers Union Report’s third recommendation to stop increasing
the damage done by drugs, the report concludes:
Accordingly, future efforts should be directed toward minimizing the damage
done by drugs. A substantial part ofthat damage stems not from the chemistry of
the drugs but from.., the laws punishing their use, society’s attitudes toward
drug users Once a policy ofminimizing damage is adopted and
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conscientiously pursued, a substantial part ofthe "drug menace" will be
eliminated even though many people will cominue to use drugs. The choice is
clear: to cominue trying, ineffectively, to stamp out illicit drug use by making it as
damaging as possible, or to seek to minimize the damage done by drugs, licit and
illicit alike.[12 p.421]
Recommendation #4- Stop Misclassifying Drugs
The Consumers Union Report finds:
Misclassification lies close to the heart ofthe drug problem, for what teachers tell
studems about drugs, and how judges sentence drug law violators depends on how
the drug is classified. Most official and unofficial classifications of drugs are
illogical and capricious The entire structure of official drug classification
rests on a series of Congressional enactmems beginning in 1914 and reaching a
climax in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Comrol Act of 1970.
The misclassifications built imo this system are not the results of sciemific study
but represem compromises between Senate and House committees, between
Republican and Democratic legislators, between Congress and the Nixon
administration.[12 p.421-22]
The Comrolled Substances Act, part ofthe Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevemion and
Comrol Act of 1970, is the basis ofthe legal authority for classifying marijuana, a
relatively benign drug, in Schedule I, the most restrictive category.[23] In an article from
the Journal ofthe American Medical Association in March 2004, there were zero deaths
attributed to marijuana while tobacco was idemified as the cause of435,000 deaths and
alcohol was the cause of 101,635 deaths in 2000.[33] The classification system based on
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the 1970 act also emphasizes licit versus illicit drugs. The two most damaging drugs in
our society in terms ofmorbidity and mortality are alcohol and tobacco.[33] They are
licit drugs and are often viewed as non-drugs.[12 p.422] A rational classification system
should result from evidence-based sciemific research ofdrugs, modes ofdrug use and the
resultant harms.
#5: Stop Viewing the Drug Problem as Primarily a National Problem
This is the one recommendation ofthe Consumers Union Report that is not as clearly
applicable today. The Report argues that many aspects ofdrug problems can be dealt
with at the state and local level. It is true that local and state efforts can be used to
address some aspects ofdrug use and its consequences. In California, the Substance
Abuse and Crime Prevemion Act of2000, Proposition 36, is an example ofthis. This
statute will be discussed in more detail below as a harm reduction measure. However, on
another level, the globalization ofour society and oforganized crime as well as
international terrorism linked with organized crime and drug trafficking calls for national
and intemational management ofdrug problems.
#6: Stop Pursuing the Goal of Stamping Out Illicit Drug Use
Ethan Nadelmann is the Executive Director ofThe Drug Policy Alliance, the leading
organization in the United States advocating alternatives to the War on Drugs. The
Alliance was formed in 2000 when the Lindesmith Center, named after Alfred
Lindesmith and formed in 1994 by the Open Society Institute, merged with the Drug
Policy Foundation. The Drug Policy Alliance was formed with the objective ofbuilding
a national drug policy reform network to broaden the public debate on drug policy and to
promote realistic alternatives to the War on Drugs based on science, compassion, health
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and human rights.[66] Nadelmann discusses drug policy reform in "The End ofthe
Epoch ofProhibition."[76 p.1 ] He states four "truths" about drugs and drug policy:
1) Most people who use drugs use them with little harm to themselves or others.
2) Drugs are here to stay. The time has come for the United States to abandon
the tired and foolish rhetoric ofa "drug-free society" and to focus instead on
learning to live with drugs in such a way that they do the least possible harm
to drug users and everyone else. Looking throughout history, one finds few if
any civilized societies that did not encounter at least one powerful
psychoactive drug [T]he societies that proved most successful in
minimizing drug-related harms were not those that sought to banish drugs and
drug users, but rather those that figured out how to control and manage drug
use through community rituals, initiation rights, the establishment and
maintenance ofpowerful social norms, and so on.
3) Prohibition is no way to run a drug policy. America learned this with alcohol
during the first third of [the twentieth century].
4) Between [the extremes ofprohibition and legalization] lie a plethora of drug
policy options, some ofwhich can reduce drug related crime, disease and
death more effectively, and oten less expensively, than anything being done
now.J76]
Harm reduction is one drug policy option that lies between the extremes of
prohibition and legalization and harm reduction is a realistic altemative to current U.S.
drug policy.
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Harm Reduction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use
Harm reduction is a public health philosophy. A useful definition is given by the
United Kingdom Harm Reduction Alliance" "Harm Reduction is a term that defines
policies, programs, services and actions that work to reduce the health, social and
economic harms to individuals, communities and society that are associated with the use
of drugs."[125]
The harm reduction approach is used in many other aspects ofour society. Motor
vehicle safety is one example. In addition to the laws designed to decrease the numbers
ofaccidems (the traffic safety laws) there are product safety designs to decrease the harm
from individual accidems (seat belts, air bags, and crumple zones). Decreasing the
prevalence ofdrug use may be a desirable goal but a drug free society is not an attainable
goal any more than accidem free highways can be attained. Reducing the harm to
individuals from drug use can and should be a goal ofreformed U.S. drug policies.
There are many examples ofharm reduction that have worked. Consider tobacco use
in the United States:
Cigarettes kill more that 400,000 Americans in a year and are as addictive as
heroin or cocaine, according to the U.S. Surgeon General. Yet forty-four million
addicted cigarette smokers have quit in the past thirty years. This is the result ofa
tremendous, successful public health campaign. This campaign succeeded
without jailing or twine-testing cigarette smokers, without prosecuting tobacco
sellers, without prohibition, and in spite ofthe annual expenditure ofbillions of
dollars to promote tobacco use.[111 ]
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Needle Exchange and Methadone Maintenance
A look at heroin addiction can illustrate in several ways the principles ofharm
reduction. First, a significam percemage ofharm from heroin use is from injections using
dirty needles. This harm results from the transmission ofblood-bome diseases,
particularly viral infections such as HIV and hepatitis as well as serious bacterial
infections such as endocarditis. This harm, transmitted disease, is done to the user and in
cases such as HIV can then be transmitted to sexual partners and subsequently
transmitted via the maternal-fetal rome to children. The damage mushrooms when you
consider not only the transmission ofdisease itself but also the social and financial
impact ofthe disease on the user, the family, the children and society. Needle exchange
programs can reduce all ofthese harms.[32] The 1972 Consumers Union Report
recommended that clean needles be available for injection drug users as a means of
reducing the spread ofblood-borne disease. This recommendation was made in the pre-
HIVera. Consider how much harm could have been avoided ifthis recommendation had
been adopted in 1972.[12 p.421] Needle exchange programs are still not standard harm
reduction policy in the United States today; they are a highly comroversial aspect ofU.S.
drug policy.
Consider another example ofharm reduction in the case ofheroin addiction. Many
studies have shown that the majority ofheroin addicts do not stay drug-flee for more than
short periods oftime; opiate addiction is a chronic, relapsing disease.[12 p.424-25; 104]
Treatment with methadone was first used to treat narcotic addicts in the 1950s; it was
used to taper addicts offtheir narcotics.[12 p.125] It was not until the 1960s that the
pioneering work done by Dr. Vincem Dole, a specialist in metabolic diseases, and Dr.
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Marie Nyswander, a psychiatrist, led to the first methadone maintenance programs in
New York City.[ 12 p. 125-27] Methadone is a long acting narcotic, given in once-per-day
oral dosage. It fulfills the narcotic craving and allows many addicts to go on with the
activities of daily life, and in some cases even become productive citizens. It has also
been shown to decrease the disease transmission and crime associated with heroin
addiction.[32 p.3] According to Dr. Dole’s observations in the 1960s" "The interesting
thing about methadone treatment is that it permits people to become whatever they
potentially are. Whereas addicts under the pressure ofdrug abuse and drug-seeking look
very much the same, when they are freed from this slavery they differentiate and become
part ofthe spectrum of humanity."[12 p. 126-27] Dr.’s Dole and Nyswander established
methadone maintenance as a result oftheir research at Rockefeller University and were
the first to advocate "the beliefthat opiate addiction creates a permanent biochemical
change in physiology so that methadone maintenance might well be necessary for the life
ofthe addict."[12 p.237-38]
In essence, much ofthe opiate dependency research that was kicked off in the
1960s can be credited with a shilling of attitudes: that heroin addiction and its
treatment is a medical problem, not a moral or political problem. This was also
the first time anyone postulated that addiction was a metabolic disease, which
ultimately led to the discovery- first by Drs. Dole and Nyswander- that
addiction has little to do with weakness ofthe mind and spirit and everything to
do with opiate receptors and endorphins. [104 p.29]
The heroin addict always craves the drug when cessation is attempted:
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The time has come to recognize what should have been obvious since 1914- that
heroin is a drug most users go right on using despite the threat of imprisonmem,
despite actual imprisonmem for years, despite repeated "cures" and long-term
residence in rehabilitation cemers, and despite the risks of disease and even death.
Heroin is a drug for which addicts will prostitute themselves. It is also a drug to
which most addicts retum despite a sincere desire to "stay clean," a firm resolve
to stay clean, an overwhelming effort to stay clean- and even a success
(sometimes enforced by conf’memem) in staying clean for weeks, momhs or even
years. This is what is meam by the statemem that heroin is an addicting drug.[12
p.424]
Methadone maintenance is still the most successful means available for the treatment
ofheroin addiction.[32 p.2] Newer drugs such as buprenorphine are being investigated
and have significam advantages over methadone. The peak opiate agonist effect of
buprenorphine reaches a ceiling at about 40% activity of full agonists such as heroin and
methadone.[104 p.30] Once this ceiling is reached, and it is reached at moderate doses,
more drug does not have any further effects.[104 p.30] Before reaching this ceiling, the
drug produces sufficiem agonist effect to prevent withdrawal symptoms.[104 p.30]
There are several advamages ofthis ceiling attribute ofbuprenorphine. The typical
opiate agonist effect ofeuphoria is limited by the ceiling and therefore the abuse potential
and potential for diversion to the black market is reduced compared with full opiate
agonists. Side effects such as respiratory depression do not occur below the ceiling and
therefore the drug has a low risk for serious or fatal overdose.[104 p.30] In addition,
buprenorphine has a longer half-life than methadone and dosing every 2 or 3 days is
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possible.[104 p.31 ] Research and developmem ofnew drugs such as buprenorphine are
important in advancing the maintenance treatment ofnarcotic addicts. However,
methadone remains the prototype for maintenance treatment ofnarcotic addicts.
Methadone maintenance remains controversial in this country, largely due to the
persistence ofthe American abstinence model ofdrug treatment. "In addition to creating
methadone treatment, the United States was also the birthplace, and is still the spiritual
cemer and home, ofthe world-wide abstinence approach to drug treatmem."[32 p.2]
Drug-free therapeutic communities such as Synanon and Phoenix House adopted the
drug-free, self-help approach from the 12-Step method of Alcoholics Anonymous.[32]
This approach to drug treatment is based on the beliefthat drugs are evil, no compromise
with drug use should be made and maintenance therapy is unacceptable. In the late
1990s, the mayor ofNew York City, Rudolph Guiliani, attempted to eliminate methadone
maintenance programs in New York City, criticizing them as immoral and as a
perpetuation of"enslavement to narcotics."[32 p.3] He backed down after public
outcry.[32 p.3] The implememation ofdrug maintenance programs still suffers because
ofthis unattainable drug-free society mentality.
Methadone remains a highly controlled drug in the United States and is dispensed
through highly regulated clinics. The DEA, a law enforcement agency rather than the
medical profession or a health care agency, retains powerful control over many aspects of
treatmem in methadone programs including dosages, schedules, admission and
termination criteria, and access to treatment.[32 p.3] In 2004, there remains a "treatment
gap" in methadone maintenance treatmem; this gap is defmed as the difference between
the number ofopiate dependent persons and those in treatmem.[34 p.2] The treatmem
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gap is currently over 600,000 persons and represents 75-80% of all addicts.[34 p.2] Of
these, there are many individuals addicted to heroin who desire to go on methadone and
much harm could be avoided if this option was available to all who desire it. "There is
no good reason for this, just politics, prejudice and ignorance" says Nadelmann ofthe
Drug Policy Alliance. A 1997 National Institute ofHealth Consensus Statement found:
Opiate-dependem persons are oiten perceived not as individuals with a disease
but as "other" or "different." Factors such as racism play a large role here but so
does the popular image ofdependence itself. Many people believe that
dependence is self-induced or a failure ofwillpower and that efforts to treat it will
inevitably fail. Vigorous and effective leadership is needed to inform the public
that dependence is a medical disorder that can be effectively treated with
significam benefits for the patiem and society.[34 p.3]
The option for addicts not maimained on methadone or another form ofopiate is to
continue heroin use, and to get their heroin from the black market and thereby perpetuate
that market and all of its consequences.
Proposition 36: Treatment Diversion
A harm reduction approach could be applied to many other aspects ofthe drug
problem in the United States, such as revision ofpolicies that have created "epidemic
incarceration." The state of California adopted Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and
Crime Prevention Act of2000, and it took effect July 1,2001.[16] Proposition 36 diverts
low-level, non-violem drug offenders convicted of simple possession for personal use
into community treatment programs instead of incarcerating them.[16] Implememation
ofProposition 36 involves collaboration between criminal justice and public health
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agencies, an innovative approach to the drug use problem. Initial reports ofthe program
are very favorable although some problems such as lack of diversity oftreatment options
as well as inadequate availability of methadone maintenance programs have been
idemified. [15] In the first year ofthe program over 30,000 non-violem drug offenders
were placed in treatment programs.[16] About halfofthese offenders were in treatment
for the first time. Methamphetamine has been idemified as the drug used by over 50% of
Proposition 36 cliems in the initial year ofthe program; cocaine and crack cocaine
represemed 15%; heroin represemed 11%.[ 16] It is estimated that the program saved
California taxpayers $279 million in its first year.[ 16]
Disproportionate Impact on Racial Minorities
Revision ofpolicies that lead to disproportionate incarceration of minorities should be
a priority for a revised U.S. drug policy. The first step could be changing the 100-to-1,
powder-to-crack cocaine ratio. The United States Sentencing Commission has made this
recommendation three times"
1. In 1995 the Commission found the 100-to-1 ratio to be unjustified and
recommended it be revised to a 1-to-1 ratio. Congress rejected the
recommendation and returned the issue to the Commission for reconsideration
and new recommendations. [102 p. 1 ]
2. In 1997 the Commission sent to Congress a unanimous recommendation to
make the penalty the same for simple possession ofpowder cocaine and crack
cocaine. Also in the 1997 report, the Commission advised that for cocaine
trafficking, the quantity triggering a five-year mandatory minimum semence
be reduced for powder cocaine and increased for crack cocaine (i.e.: reduce
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the 100-to-1 ratio). The Commission urged the change be made "... as soon
as possible, as hundreds ofpeople will continue to be sentenced each month
under the current law." Congress did not act on this recommendation.[90
Executive Summary; 102]
3. In May 2002 the Commission issued a third report on cocaine and federal
semencing policy. In this report the Commission recommended increasing the
amount ofcrack cocaine that triggers the five-year mandatory minimum from
5 grams to at least 25 grams and that this be applicable only to cases of
trafficking. This would have the effect of decreasing the powder-to-crack
ratio to 20-to-1. The Commission further recommended that the mandatory
minimum for simple possession ofcrack cocaine be repealed. The 2002
Report also contains the recommendation that sentencing enhancements be
adopted to reflect drug offenses that involve bodily injury from violence,
distribution to persons under age twenty-one, and repeat offenders. Congress
has not acted on the recommendations in the 2002 report.[90]
Eric Sterling’s assertion that the Justice Department’s choice ofcases is the
underlying problem in the epidemic incarceration of minorities should also be a focus of
policy reform. A method could be developed for choosing cases for federal court that is
blind to the race ofthe offender. Sterling also claims that ifthe federal governmem
prosecuted the "big fish," the high-level dealers, then the "racial disparity in cocaine
semencing would disappear."[109]
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MDMA/Ecstasy Harm Reduction
Harm reduction for users ofMDMA/Ecstasy has taken several forms. In the comext
ofdance parties" provision of"chill rooms" to avoid the complication of hyperthermia,
largely believed to be setting dependant; availability of electrolyte replacemem drinks to
prevem dehydration, hyponatremia and hyperthermia; provision of on-site emergency
medical service; and distribution ofeducational materials on drugs are some examples.
Ironically, some ofthese harm reduction provisions were used as evidence for the
"knowledge" requirement ofthe Crack House Statute by the prosecution in both the State
Palace Theater and Club La Vela Cases. On-site emergency medical service at a Yankee
game is in the best imerest ofpublic safety; at a rave, it is evidence ofa crime. Critics of
the RAVE Act are concerned that an unintended consequence ofthe law will be to
increase harm from MDMA/Ecstasy use because its use will be driven underground, into
unsafe venues where safeguards are not readily available, or that legitimate venues that
would have adopted a harm reduction approach will be deterred from such measures out
of fear that the measures could be used as evidence against them. This would be a
manifestation ofthe "chilling effect" ofeven a few prosecutions.
CONCLUSION
Illicit drug use is without doubt one of the most important issues confroming America
in the twenty-first century. This essay has touched on some aspects ofthis
extraordinarily complex issue. I have used a contemporary drug issue, the club drug
MDMA/Ecstasy, and the latest federal drug legislation, the RAVE Act, as a means to
examine U.S. drug policy. Admittedly, viewing all illicit drug consumption as a single
issue oversimplifies the situation. There are very differem factors involved in soft drug
versus hard drug use, rational versus compulsive use, and responsible versus destructive
use. The RAVE Act is only one example, the most recently enacted example, of a legal
weapon in the federal government’s drug war arsenal. I have illustrated that America’s
drug policy is the cause ofmuch ofthe harm resulting from illicit drugs, that American
citizens are the primary casualties ofthe War on Drugs, and that the collateral damage
from the War is profound. Continuation of the drug war is not in the best interest of our
society; not for individual members of our society; not for the diverse communities that
comprise our society; and not for our society as a whole. In my opinion, the RAVE Act,
exemplifies yet another law that will cost more money, is unlikely to accomplish much
actual benefit in terms of reduction of drug use, may violate constitutional fights of some
citizens, and may increase the harm done to consumers ofthe "notorious chemical
sacrament" ofthe club scene.
In discussing the currem U.S. prohibition paradigm, Ethan Nadelmann refers to
America’s "drug-prohibition complex" as analogous to the "military-industrial complex"
discussed by Presidem Eisenhower in his farewell address to the nation in 1961 .[77]
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Eisenhower was referring to the "permanent armaments industry ofvast proportions"
established in the United States in the mid-twemieth cemury.[40] The "drug-prohibition
complex" in 2004 is also ofvast proportions; it is composed ofthe hundreds ofthousands
of law enforcement personnel, the U.S. prison system, anti-drug organizations and many
others who benefit economically, politically, emotionally, and even spiritually from the
ever-escalating War on Drugs. Formation ofthis complex began in 1914 with enactment
ofthe Harrison Narcotics Act. Over the past century it has expanded and has become so
much a part ofour society that retreat in the War on Drugs will not come without
incredible challenges. However, in my opinion, America cannot maimain its currem
policies and thereby continue to increase the damage being caused by drugs; damage that
results from the intended and profound unintended consequences ofthe War on Drugs.
The opposite extreme from prohibition, free-market legalization, is an option that is
supported by rational argumems based on the economics ofthe underground drug
industry. Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman is an advocate ofdrug
legalization.[77; 117] The crux ofthe economic argumem for legalization is that the
prohibition ofdrugs and the resultant black markets generate extraordinary harm to
individuals and society: violem crime, corruption ofgovernmem, empowerment of
criminals, and transfer ofvast sums ofmoney to criminals from the purchase ofdrugs and
from unpaid tax revenue.[73 chap.2] (The illicit drug industry is one ofthe largest
industries in the world. In 2000 the total revenue in the illicit drug trade in the United
States alone was about $64 billion; tax on this revenue would be about $20 billion
dollars.[73 p.17]) According to the economic argumem, the way to eliminate the
majority ofthese harms is to eliminate the black markets by legalizing drugs.[73 chap.7]
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In my opinion free-market legalization is not a realistic option for America. I base this
opinion not on the economic argumem, which in theory is convincing, but rather on the
social implications of free-market legalization of drugs. Most drug policy reformers do
not advocate legalization. They don’t want crack or crystal sold at the local 7-Eleven,
citing an exaggerated accusation by former drug czar General Barry McCaffrey.[77]
What is a realistic alternative to the War on Drugs? Between the extremes of
prohibition and legalization is the policy option ofharm reduction. In my opinion this is
a realistic goal for reform ofU.S. drug policy. Harm reduction, as discussed in Section
III ofthis essay, is a public health philosophy for management ofthe drug problem. It
establishes as a priority the well being of individuals and society. The currem debate on
drug policy, started many decades ago but expanded in recem years, is the first step in
educating the public on policy reform options and specifically on harm reduction. A pre-
requisite to adopting the option ofharm reduction, and something that will be a great
challenge for many in America, is acceptance ofthe fact that drug use exists and a drug-
free society is not a realistic goal. Once this fact is accepted, harm reduction can take
many forms, some ofwhich were discussed in Section III ofthis essay. Harm reduction
can be implememed gradually, within the comext ofour existing legal structure, making
changes one step at a time, learning from other countries, learning from evidence-based
research, and learning from past mistakes.
The 1972 Consumers Union Report concluded with a f’mal thought: "We hope that
when the next generation takes over, this Consumers Union Report will still remain
useful as a guide to how mankind has used and misused drugs in the past, and as a
warning against repeating the errors society is making today."[12 p.434] The next
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generation has taken over and it is time for change, change in the form ofharm reduction
as the basis for reform ofAmerican drug policy.
APPENDIX
"Crack House Statute"
US CODE COLLECTION
TITLE 21 > CHAPTER 13 > SUBCHAPTER I > Part D > Sec. 856.
Sec. 856.- Establishment of manufacturing operations
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful to
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner,
lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent,
lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the building,
room, or enclosure for the purpose ofunlaw-ully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance.
(b) Penalties
Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be semenced to a term
of imprisonment of not more than 20 years or fine of not more than $500,000, or
both, or a fine of $2,000,000 for a person other than an individual.
(c) Violation as offense against property
A violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be considered an offense against
property for purposes of section 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) of title 18.
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Crack House Statute modification into the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of
2003, a.k.a, the RAVE Act
US CODE COLLECTION
TITLE 21 > CHAPTER 13 > SUBCHAPTER I > Part D > Sec. 856.
Sec. 856.- Maintaining drug-involved premises
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful to
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether
permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or
using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either
as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or
without compensation, the place for the purpose ofunlawfully manufacturing,
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.
(b) Penalties
Any person who violates subsection (a) ofthis section shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment ofnot more than 20 years or
f’me ofnot more than $500,000, or both, or a f’me of $2,000,000 for a person other
than an individual.
(c) Violation as offense against property
A violation of subsection (a) ofthis section shall be considered an offense against
property for purposes of section 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) oftitle 18.
(d) Civil Penalty
(1) Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be subject to a civil penalty
ofnot more than the greater of-
(A) $250,000 or
(B) 2 times the gross receipts, either known or estimated, that were
derived from each violation that is attributable to the person.
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(2) Ifa civil penalty is calculated under paragraph (1)(B), and there is more
than defendant, the court may apportion the penalty between multiple
violators, but each violator shall be jointly and severally liable for the civil
penalty under this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be subject to declaratory and
injunctive remedies as set forth in section 403(0.
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